Friday, June 23, 2017
Myth of February 23rd 1918 Part 2
Myth of February 23rd, 1918 Part 2
by George Levy
especially for PoliSMI
Part 2
The assassination of two Provisional Government Ministers
On the evening of January 18th the two ministers were taken to the Marie Hospital. That night Red Guards and sailors forced their way into the hospital and brutally murdered them both.
It is true that Izvestia condemned the crime, saying:
“Apart from everything else it is bad from a political point of view. This is a fearful blow aimed at the Revolution, at the Soviet authorities.”
Pavel Dybenko, also condemned the actions and published a remarkable order,
“The honor of the Revolutionary Fleet must not bear the stain of an accusation of revolutionary sailors having murdered their helpless enemies, rendered harmless by imprisonment, I call upon all who took part in the murder…to appear of their own accord before the Revolutionary Tribunal.”
Although it was widely known and reported by news agencies that the sailors and Red Guards who were armed and involved in the murders had gone straight to the hospital from the office of the Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and Profiteering (Cheka). In addition, according to the New York Times …For many, it was generally known that Dzerhzinsky and V. Bonch-Bruyevitch, had some connection with the murders.
The Treaty of Brest Litovsk becomes the avenue to wit Lenin consolidates his power over the Russian peoples. Lenin is determined to assent to the demands of the Germans, which including annexation, indemnities and specifically allows for the Germans to take control of Russian naval vessels. The questions and political differences relating to the Treaty of Brest Litovsk puts into motion the events that will lead to the censorious actions, arrest, and removal of Dybenko from government.
Dybenko’s Waterloo…The Treaty of Brest Litovsk
In politics, nothing happens by accident. If it happens, you can bet it was planned that way. FD Roosevelt 32nd President of the United States
In mid February 1918 a Central Committee meeting was being held on the question of Peace with the Germans and the signing of the Treaty of Brest Litovsk.
Right away Dybenko voices his opposition to the accord, as Peoples Commissariat of the Navy, he had just formulated a report and presented it to the Sovnarkom entitled:
“The Strategic Situation in the Sea in Case of Active Actions of Germany”
According to the directive of the Naval Board the main bases with all battle and support ships were to be moved from Revel and Helsingfors to Kronstadt. The file was also considered a blueprint of the great Ice March famously coordinated and achieved a couple months later by Admiral Shchastny. However, at this meeting Dybenko is censored…summarily sanctioned by Lenin and not allowed to speak until after a vote had been cast
Others spoke out against and weren’t sanctioned such as Radek,
“We are going to fight, and if we go down fighting the cause of the revolution is saved”
and Uritsky, ‘Would it not be better to die with honor?’
Meanwhile, Kollontai is in Helsingfors attempting to convince the sailors to put forth a vote of no confidence regarding Lenin’s position on the Treaty.
So different was the view of policy, between Lenin’s Peace Party (those Bolsheviks who were in favor of signing the Treaty) and those in opposition that several members of the new government threatened to resign. This group included, Krestinky, Volodarsky, Bronsky, Dybenko, Kollontai, and Bukharin as well as others.
A considerable number in the government still believed that the signing of the peace is; “the suicide of the Russian revolution and the murder of revolution elsewhere”.
Nevertheless, Lenin persuaded the majority to his view and it was decided upon by the Central Executive to conclude peace by 116, against 85, those not voting numbering 26.
Dybenko’s opposition to the treaty does not go unnoticed…
On February 18th, Robert Bender of United Press wrote,
…Sailors of the Russian Baltic fleet, first to join the Petrograd revolution and then jump to the Bolshevik, have broken way to complete anarchism, which is sweeping through Finland.
According to Dr. Ignatus, Finland’s representative here today, the Baltic sailors are now,
“beyond the control of the Petrograd Bolsheviki”
On the February 19th, Jaques Sadoul a member of the French Military Attachment meets with Lenin and Trotsky and interviews the two. Sadoul is aware of the German advance to secure the treaty’s provisions. Sadoul asks Lenin what his feelings about the defense of young Russia is to be. Lenin responds by suggesting, “All those in government who want to do something should stop talking and conclude peace in order to consolidate and extend the revolution.” Sadoul urged upon them a partisan war in order to defend Moscow and Petrograd to the bitter end.
Trotsky seemed to agree, Lenin was not convinced.
On the 20th, a meeting took place in the War Ministry attended by Podvoiskii, Dybenko, Krylenko, and representatives of the General staff. Krylenko reported on the disastrous situation at the front and the difficulties being experienced in mobilizing the population for the defense of Pskov. Podvoiskii raised the issue of tactics, should they he asked fight a partisan or positional war. Dybenko supported the idea of a partisan war but the military advisors present stated there was little evidence supporting such a position. The meeting decided to adopt a conventional positional war as part of its defensive strategy.
Facing absolute subjection at the hands of the advancing Germans, Lenin and Krylenko took the steps to initiate a nominal defense against the invaders of their country. Their orders directed that guerrilla warfare be carried on and that Petrograd be placed in a state of siege. The defense of Russia would be carried on by a partisan war.
On the 21st, Lenin writes, ‘The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger’, calling for the country’s entire manpower and resources to be placed entirely at the service of revolutionary defense and that all soviets and revolutionary organizations are ordered to defend every position to the last drop.
Dybenko, still in opposition to Lenin’s views goes to Helsingfors and recruits two thousand sailors to help stem the tide of the advancing Germans. Dybenko tells his sailors the peace negotiations with Germany are wrecked. He goes on to declare in the plenary meeting that Trotsky has deranged the negotiations, which to some people, he included, found shameful and humiliating.
The next day on the 22nd order № 78 on revolutionary mobilization was issued.
Dybenko finds the midshipman Pavlov and appoints him chief of the composite detachment urgently formed to defend Russia from the advancing Germans. The first Northern detachments of the Baltic sailors would be created and were advised that they are going to be sent to the Narva region.
Also on the 22nd news from Petrograd hit the wires, This dispatch is especially telling as those in charge of “official dispatches” call for Dybenko’s dismissal “prior to” the events of February 23rd.
“Disorganization in the Russian Navy has reached an extreme point, and there is no likelihood of any order being obeyed.”
Headlines read, Afraid of Anarchist Riots and Ultra-Radicals Gaining Control of Navy
And then the story line, Anarchists Control Fleet.
New of the fleet is still more disquieting. The anarchist movement in it is gaining ground. Demands are being made for the dismissal of M.Dybenko, the People’s Commissar of Marine.
Meanwhile, at the Narva District and confronting the German advance Dybenko meets up with P.M. Bulkin who is chief of the group of sailors and soldiers retreating from Revel. Bulkin gives Dybenko a copy of his report sent to the Naval Board. Dybenko read, “All army units are demoralized, we are almost alone, those who stand to the end and defend the Soviet Republic. We asked for an additional 500 (or how many you have) sailors…..”, Bulkin went on to state the Germans kept bringing new reinforcements as his detachment continued to diminish.
The remains of Bulkin’s detachment were joined with the Northern Battalion of Dybenko’s.
The first fight the Northern Battalion was involved in took place near the small village of Ivveve. The fight lasted all day and all night on the 2nd of March. The air was cool and the snow thick making for a difficult engagement. The echelon of sailors met the Germans with two armored vehicles on platforms prepared to halt the advance.
The fighting of the battalion held in check many of advance attempts of the enemy. However, as with Bulkins units in Revel, no matter how many of the enemies were shot down they were always able to bring in more reinforcements. The battalion met the challenge of the enemy for what seemed like hours.
Then during one point of the fever pitched battle there was an explosion that rocked the earth. After the smoke cleared, the engineer driver and his assistant were killed and ten sailors seriously wounded. The sailors took up a defensive position. The fighting proved difficult without light artillery and reinforcements.
On the morning of March 3rd, the Germans began advancing with two columns, one along the railway and the other to the North along the Revel highway. It was early, the exhausted Northern Detachment were prepared. The Germans walked into a hornet’s nest. Fierce fighting took place near Vayvara-Korf. ...The fight continued with Dybenko, Pavlov, and Bulkin leading the detachment of sailors and soldiers from the Putilovsky plant through the thick snow attacking several times.
Brave Russians advanced several kilometers attacking the right flank of the Germans near Primorsky sector near Narva , The teutons column advancing from the north won over the Russian troops that were fighting there and in this way created the threat for Dybenko’s detachment of being turned from the rear. With no hope for reinforcements and over 500 dead and many more wounded, Dybenko was forced to retreat
One of the leaders of Dybenko’s detachment recalled, “the Supreme military council and specifically Bonch-Bruevitch provoked them on many occasions. The latter one kept promising to procure the sailors with everything they needed to fight but failed to do so. According to this commissar the Red Army units didn’t just fail to help the sailors but moreover they were intentionally precluding them from organizing proper defense, while the sailors had no ammunition left the Red Army soldier had way too much and they spared them till it was too late to use them”. Dybenko, Pavlov, Bulkin, and the remaining Northern Battallion retreat to Yamburg.
At Yamburg, Parskii informs Dybenko of the change of command; news not only to Dybenko but his whole staff. According to Tshekin just hours earlier in direct line talks with Lurie in Petrograd it was known that Parskii arrived yesterday and only as a member of the military headquarters, as far as he knew, the commander was and is still Dybenko.
Parskii via telegraph goes on to ask for confirmation of his authority and how to deal with this brazen and impertinent Dybenko. Bonch-Bruyevich recalls he was “alarmed” and gave a detailed report to Lenin.
Archival materials reveal the decision to remove Dybenko as Narva’s Commander…was made by Lenin and his associates prior to any conflicts at Narva…furthermore; in three separate telegrams sent by Parskii to the “front office” not once is there a reference to alcohol abuse. Quite contrary, the telegrams detail retreating Red Army units not mentioning or referring once to the sailors echelons.
In M. Bonch-Bruyevich’s memoirs, “I was not privy to the contents that Lenin wrote in his telegram to Dybenko but I can tell you the next morning, I received a telegram from Dybenko in Yamburg which rather amused me.” The telegram read,
“I transfer command to his Excellency General Parskii”
using the cancelled Tsar’s time title to make it sound more sarcastic.
The next day February 25th Lenin published, A Painful But Necessary Lesson, where upon he derides both Shtienberg and Dybenko. The latter was referred to in the following.
…On the other hand there have been the painful and humiliating reports of regiments refusing to retain their positions, of refusal to defend even the Narva Line, and of disobedience to the order to destroy everything in the event of a retreat, not to mention the running away, the chaos, ineptitude, helplessness, and sloviness.
Dybenko wondered, “On whose lap should the term “shameful position” lie upon?”
Three days later on the 28th of February still more covert actions are taken to discredit Dybenko…Through official statement Krylenko reports to the press…
( the following statement underlies the course of action Lenin, Trotsky, Krylenko, etc. take to discredit Dybenko and the Sailors. The article should be disseminated and reviewed sentence by sentence…in doing so one begins to understand the path in which Lenin and his associates intend to take…furthermore, not once does the politically powerful mention “sailors” unless of course it benefits them. In this article…if one replaces Russian troops, Russian peasant soldiers, and Russian army with ‘sailors’ one sees the preparation to do away with the sailors influence. Additionally, a slight toward Dybenko’s peasant roots is referred to an attempt to minimize Dybenko.)
“Russian troops, almost without exception, have refused flatly to fight. A division, which was supposed to be defending Narva, has arrived at Gatchina. They replied they did not intend to fight’. “Immediately the first few German troops appeared, the Russian peasant soldiers who, being peasants, not industrialists, were interested merely in the land question and cared nothing for the revolution, started eastward in an uncontrollable wave, threatening to suck all the towns on the way. The Russian army was Germany’s strongest weapon. In driving it towards Petrograd they were driving a herd of stampeding cattle, which would trample down everything in its way. The revolutionary workmen could have put up a real fight against the German, but they could do nothing against the Russian army, which must disappear before the revolution can begin to create any real military force for itself. The workmen of the towns are eager to fight.
Dybenko returns first to Petrograd and takes in the machinations that are taking place against him. He finds plenty of individuals in opposition to Lenin’s designs to convince the Bolsheviki into signing the peace with Germany.
The peace party, headed by Premier Lenin, insists that real defense being out of the question in view of the complete collapse of the army, it is better to accept the German terms and thus render it possible for the Soviet Government to maintain itself on limited territory and continue its work of fostering a world revolution which will ultimately upset all the plans of the German Imperialists.
The opposition party urges that once Russia is completely delivered into the hands of the powerful Imperialists of Germany it will be impossible to maintain Soviet rule to any serious extent on Russian territory, and that it would be better to retire fighting into the depths of Russia than to consent formally to the present humiliation. Within the opposition party, is a majority of Left Social Revolutionaries and a faction of the Bolsheviki headed by Radek, Dybenko, Kollontai, and Riazanov who are still for revolutionary war.
Lenin wrote, “Since the conclusion of the Brest peace, some comrades who call themselves “Left Communists” have formed an “Opposition” in the Party, and in consequence of this their activity is slipping further and further towards a completely disloyal and impermissible violation of Party discipline. Unrelenting, are those in the opposition…Lenin continues that “such behavior was and remains a step towards a split on the part of the above-mentioned comrades”.
Lenin avoids and does not allow himself to be seen on the streets of Petrograd by those he disparaged. People whom he had damned as compromisers and fence-sitters in the past founded a newspaper directed against him. This daily newspaper, The Kommunist, for which Radek and Bukharin, Kollontai and Dybenko all wrote, published just eleven issues between March 5th and March 19th.
The political atmosphere is on edge as the culmination of matters will be determined in Moscow at the Fourth All-Congress of the Soviets. Dybenko’s future will be assigned to the outcome of the vote on the Treaty. Lenin and Trotsky are fervently working to rid themselves of the leader of the “armed fist of the revolution”. To this end and behind the scenes Lenin and others are secretly arranging their “victory”. Unfortunately for Great October and the people of Russia the outcome will be one that takes Russia into a dark abyss for over seventy years. The contest for and against ratification is now between the Left Socialist Revolutionaries in conjunction with part of the Bolsheviki calling themselves the “Left Communists” versus another part of the Bolsheviki, the so-called peace party led by Lenin.
From his office, Lenin undeterred by the opposition party to which he now referred to as “waverer’s” sent out a statement via Moscow Dispatch, “The Congress,’ it says, “will recognize that the policy of the Soviet Government in the questions of war and peace was the right one. It will recognize that it was impossible to carry on the war when the country had no army. The congress will also face the main outlines of a policy of economic reconstruction and complete the recuperation of the forces for the purpose of repelling predatory imperialism. And this program the Soviet Government must put into execution on the day after the final conclusion of peace.”
Lenin would not be denied…the Moscow Congress finished its business in no less than three days…the Congress ratified the peace treaty…true, there was opposition, and there were short and sharp arguments between Lenin and his critics.
The Left Social Revolutionary Commissary for Justice, Steinberg, was particularly vehement in his condemnation of the disgraceful peace. He urged that by ratification the Soviet Government would gain nothing and that peace was a complete betrayal of the interests of Great October. Commissar Dybenko stated he was convinced of the necessity of the revolutionary war, believing that the truce with the German imperialists doesn’t save Soviet power brought about by the revolution.
In the final tally the voting was 704 for, 261 against, while 115 abstained from voting….the Congress also voted to transfer the capital to Moscow, and would go on to re-elected the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets.
Prior to the Congress and while still in Petrograd a special Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee of seven members had been formed with Leon Trotzky as President. With Lenin’s sweeping changes in government in store Krylenko will resign his military portfolio in expectation of acquiring Shteinberg’s Minister of Justice position.
At the Fourth All-Russian Congress, Lenin raised the question of who should run the military administration. Who, asked Lenin, was capable of creating a new military organization that would be able to resist the enemy’s regular army? Who could breathe life into an old army? Lenin went on to state the German offensive of the previous month had shown that the triumvirate governing the Commissariat for Military Affairs: Krylenko, Podvoiskii, and Dybenko—were not up to handling the difficult task of creating a regular army. Lenin declared the current triumvirate held leftist views on military organization that he did not approve of. Lenin further stated he was not prepared to put a military expert of the old school in charge either, as it would be unacceptable to both the army and the people. (Note Lenin does not mention the navy) After so-called long deliberation with confidants, Lenin states Trotsky is the answer.
Trotsky recalled this event by writing,
“Not until March 13 was there a public announcement of my resignation from the commissariat of foreign affairs, coinciding with the announcement of my appointment as war commissary and as chairman of the Supreme War Council, formed only a little while before on my initiative. Thus Lenin achieved his end after all.”
These declarations of Lenin’s show the target for removal was Dybenko for Krylenko and Podvoiskii were two of Lenin’s most ardent supporters and the two would take an active role in the discredit of Dybenko. The only member of this triumvirate, which held so-called “leftist” views was Dybenko; as one has read based upon numerous disagreements including the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. Furthermore, if a military expert of the old school i.e. Parskii was unacceptable to both the army and the people, why wouldn’t such a man be rejected by Dybenko and the sailors. What were Trotsky’s qualifications to lead such an administration? These questions would not be asked nor answered.
Protocol 82
After the All-Russian Congress, Lenin chairs a meeting with the People’s Commissars in order to “officially” indict Dybenko on the charges that will be presented against him.
Those in attendance Tsuryuopa, Stuchka, Krylenko, Polevin, Pravdin, Bronsky, Larin, Milyutin, Petrovsky, Bogolenov, Kozmin, Shlyapnikov, Krasikov, Nevsky, Kozlovsky, Trotsky, Raskolnikov, Stalin, and Slobodchkov will herald in Lenin’s unabashed authoritarian rule for Russia. These are the men who believe that the will to freedom can only emerge once the existing economic and political system has been replaced by a dictatorship of the proletariat.
Unfortunately for Russia as its history demonstrates, authoritarian methods will simply replace one coercive state by another, equally despotic and remote from the people, and which will no more 'wither away' than its capitalist predecessor
Dybenko always maintained that the initiative must come from below, that a free society must be the result of the will to freedom of a large section of the population. This is the difference between Dybenko’s libertarian ideas and Lenin’s authoritative designs. The following details Lenin’s approach…by destroying Dybenko in effect Lenin does away with libertarian mindsets as there can and never will be common ground between the two viewpoints.
Those in attendance discussed Protocol 82; the order of arresting members of the Soviet of Peoples Commissars, Krylenko’s indictment against Dybenko, in addition to decisions about replacements in the investigation commission on the Dybenko case.
On the basis of the Krylenko’s report about the so-called facts and evidence that was supposedly uncovered by the investigation and due to the alleged accusations against Dybenko and the imaginary proof that sufficiently supports these allegations the Soviet of the Peoples’ Commissars has ruled the following:
Taking into account that there are exact and definite cases which the investigation couldn’t refute like the facts of the drunken parties that took place with Dybenko’s permission we, the Soviet of the Peoples’ Commissars order:
1. To carry on with the investigation.
2. Dybenko has to be temporarily relieved from his post of the People’s Commissar of the Navy till the completion of the investigation.
3. The duties of the Peoples’ Commissar of the Navy are to be passed on to this deputy comrade ….
Alongside with this on the issue of detaining the Peoples’ Commissars, we order that they can be detained and deprived of freedom exclusively on the orders of the Presidium of the Central Committee and signed by its chairman or his deputy and the secretary, or on the orders of the Soviet of the Peoples’ Commissars apart of the cases when the detention takes place at the immediately crime scene.
A telegram, a secret communiquй had just been sent to the Extreme Commission for the issues of fighting Contra-revolution or the infamous Cheka…
Lenin and V. Bonch-Bruyevitch wrote and signed to Dzerzhinsky.the following:
“In the light of the information that throws shadow over the Peoples’ Naval Commissar, Dybenko and very grave accusations against him concerning the military operation at Narva and fight against the German troops, the Presidium and the Central Executive Committee of the Party commands you to immediately detain commissar Dybenko and to inform the VTSIK presidium about this arrest. The special investigation commission is charged with conducting this investigation, determining the degree of guilt of the Peoples’
Commissar Dybenko and estimating the correctness of the statements we received. We order you to keep this whole matter top secret under your personal responsibility”. The telegram ordered Dybenko immediately to Moscow for unauthorized leave of war position at Narva together with his detachment.
Back in Petrograd Dybenko, realizing he would be relieved of his duties as the Chairman of the Board of the Peoples Commissariat of the Navy, does not respond to the call for his arrest.. Several days pass, his good friend Pavlov comes to see him. They talk a long time analyzing what had happened. Pavlov recommends Dybenko show up for court and tells him, “Admit whatever you are guilty of, and reject what is not true. Stick up for the sailors, they fought heroically, and if the artillery supported us, we could have developed our success.
Malkov comes to visit as well. He also suggests Dybenko go to trial and stand on his merit and unblemished record with regard to his stands for freedom and what he did for the revolution. Kollontai also came. She greeted him and took off her fur hat, put it on the sofa, and unbuttoned her coat. “It’s cold in the room,” said Dybenko as he took the kettle from the windowsill and soon came back with boiling water. He filled up the aluminum mug, and got some ship’s biscuits and two voblas(fish jerky). “Warm yourself up”, he said in a dry voice. Kollontai also recommends Dybenko show up for court. She tells him, “In no way could this military tribunal find you guilty of anything except your love of freedom for the Russian people”.
The Arrest of Dybenko
Days later a Petrograd message received in London carries the report that on Monday night three of the Peoples Commissionaires, names not given, entrusted with the reorganization of the Red revolutionary navy, were mysteriously murdered. Other reports from Moscow state that the Council of Peoples Commissaries has ordered the arrest of Dybenko, the Commissar of Marine, for opposition to the ratification of the peace treaty. A slip by the official censor…this press dispatch affirms the real reason why Dybenko was arrested and subject to be shot. Because of his political views, yet political views alone were not enough to cause Lenin concern. Pavel Dybenko would arrive in Moscow as a prisoner. Lenin’s fears are confirmed as immediately, Dybenko’s arrest raises protest among the sailors, and a group of sailors went to the new capital, demanding his release pending trial.
Indeed, a detachment of sailors came from the northern front to Moscow with the intention of securing Dybenko’s release, but they were stopped at the Bologne Station and told force was not necessary…yet. Nonetheless, the sailors declare they will bombard the Kremlin and do away with Lenin and Trotsky if Dybenko is not released or is harmed. The sailors demanded Dybenko’s release on their surety and the appointment of another court of inquiry, half to be composed of sailors.
Reports alleging wrongdoings are ablaze as a session of the presidium Cheka takes place in Moscow. Dybenko and his sailors are accused of robbing the mint on March 11th for his personal gain…another item on the agenda raised a question concerning an “attempt of the sailors to murder Sverdlov”. Dzerzhinsky declared the sailors have threatened to finish with the colleague of the leader of revolution. However, despite the gravity of the situation, these accusations are swept away seen merely as support to affirm the decision to rid Dybenko and his revolutionary sailors, from influencing government. .
Dzerzhinsky, “revolted by excesses of the sailors”, threatens to, “publish widely all information on the arrest of the Chairman of Tsentrobalt”, Dzerzhinsky goes on to state, “those who attempt to release Pavel from custody are to be considered enemies and traitors to the people”. The Sovnarkom discussed the meaning of “attempt to” resolving to address the situation with a brief resolution, “to disarm the sailors.”
In conversation with Jacques Saduol, Kollontai told him of her meeting with Dzerzhinsky, the latter having in effect ordered Kollontai to keep Dybenko and his sailors from every “possible unreasonable action”. Dzerzhinsky ends his discussion by sharing with Kollontai that he, “wishes to avoid decisive steps available to the All-Russian Extreme Commission.”
Kollontai protested vehemently against Dybenko’s imprisonment and she spoke to all who would hear on behalf of Dybenko and as a result Kollontai; resigned her portfolio
In conversation with Clara Zetkin, Kollontai’s longtime confident, Lenin was said to have commented that he “found it difficult to trust a woman who confuses her political work with her personal relationships.”
Kollontai penned several letters to Pavel while he was in prison;
“All my soul, my heart, my thoughts, everything is with you and for you, my darling, my beloved. I want you to know that I can live and will live only with you. Without you my life is dead and unbearable. You must be proud of yourself and confident. You can hold your head straight as no slander will ever mar your beautiful, pure, and noble character”.
After several days she and the sailors obtained Dybenko’s release on their bond and his word. Kollontai was loudly protesting the policies of Lenin and told Sadoul, “she felt Dybenko had been betrayed, Narva was not the actual reason for his arrest, Lenin had simply used it as an excuse.”
.
Still not swayed by the politically powerful surrounding him Dybenko releases the following statement upon being released on bond.
“My revolutionary conscience doesn’t allow me to stay totally passive while there are threats from both internal and external enemies to everything we conquered with so much blood. I promise to appear in court and respond in front of judges and the people”
Kollontai and Dybenko…the sailor and the aristocrat…the proud romantic couple of the revolution were now outcasts.
Recalling Kollontai during this time Jacques Sadoul remembered Kollontai as being completely enamored with the beautiful Dybenko and noted.
Vestal of the Revolution, she would like to maintain the flame of the maximalist ideal in all its purity. She has thrown herself headlong into the opposition, she criticizes severely the brutal measures taken by her comrades against the anarchists, and is indignant at the concession to the moderate and bourgeois opposition allowed everyday by the government.
Samara
In April of 1918…after the alleged events of February 23rd, after the Fourth All Russian Congress, after the renaming of Lenin’s Peace party to the Communist party, after Dybenko’s arrest, and after his being bailed out of jail…Dybenko makes his way to Samara. Supposedly against the conditions of his parole although Dybenko states he informed those he was responsible to notify.
Dybenko’s arrival in Samara had no relation to the events of Narva. Even so, in most historical citations one continues to be told the following, “after hearing the first cackle of the German guns Dybenko ran all the way to Samara”. Accuracy and truth do not matter as long as Dybenko is seen in a negative light. .
Ironically, even at a time when the current power structure were eliminating democratic thought…Pavel Dybenko subjected himself to a vote of the Samara Representative body on the question of his returning to Moscow . Krylenko demands the re-arrest of Dybenko, stressing Dybenko should be sent back to Moscow immediately. On the contrary, Dybenko rebukes Krylenko and others of the new government. Dybenko went on to express these views in a letter that would be published in Samara’s Labour Republic…calling upon the people of Russia to “rise up against the powerful and to know that their destiny lay in their own hands”.
Delo of Dybenko
"Truth always rises, no matter how it's crushed into the ground. You can't crush the truth”
The trial of Pavel Dybenko in May of 1918 brought to the surface political differences. Defense attorney Shteinberg declared the trial had nothing to do with Narva…instead with Dybenko’s political difference with the ruling order. On the other hand Krylenko and Trotsky demand the death penalty for Dybenko.
Dybenko speaking to the Revolutionary Tribunal stated, “I am not afraid of a verdict for myself, I am afraid of a verdict for the October revolution and its achievements; gained by the cost of the proletarian blood. We as a nation cannot let personal conflicts and intrigues eliminate someone who disagrees with the policy of the majority in government. No matter what the verdict is found by this tribunal, the sailors know the truth, and I will remain in the first rows of the revolution because the sailors promoted me and they still trust me.”
The revolutionary tribunal finds him innocent of all charges put forth. As a result, Pavel Dybenko was removed from his authority with the navy and his membership in the party revoked.
Even though universally held opinions regarding February 23rd remain, the discredit and disparaging of Pavel Dybenko runs contrary to the historical record. Pavel Dybenko was not the coward or loose cannon as proposed by Lenin et al. Double implications have become a familiar theme…one for the winners Lenin and Trotsky…the other for public consumption. The Myth that February 23rd was “birth of the Red Army Day” can be frankly tied to Trotsky’s taking control of the military in addition the Myth of February 23rd coming to be known as “Victory Day” can also be understood as the day Lenin and Trotsky wrested away the last vestige of challenge to their power by centralizing the military. In order to achieve these results Pavel Dybenko and the sailors’ soviet Tsentrobalt were destined to become ashes under the rug of historical significance.
However one looks at Russian history, Pavel Dybenko’s name should be included as one studies the happenings in Russia during the early twentieth century. Whatever political paths Russia took, the world should know for a moment in history, Dybenko fought for the rights of the common man.
A study of the historical record does not agree with the viewpoint that Pavel Dybenko be supposed a “black mark” in the history of the Russian nation. The authoritative personalities may have propagandized the current understanding of Pavel Dybenko but for the Russian people of the working class, the disenfranchised, and all others who have been exploited by the powerful...he is a champion.
Myth of Februrary 23rd, 1918
Myth of February 23rd, 1918
by George Levy
especially for PoliSMI
Part 1
Pavel Dybenko speaks to the Revolutionary Tribunal
May 1918
The current understanding of February 23rd maintains an unjustified myth and detracts the Russian populace from coming to know a true and accurate account of the aftermath of revolution and the consequences that followed. What we do know about this time…V. Lenin and V. Bonch-Bruyevitch have told us and therefore the subsequent perception is a result of this “truth”
How Russia and the World Views February 23rd
On February 24, 2009 Evgeny Levin’s article The Red Army-Strongest of All, published in The Russia Mir, well represents the mindset of February 23 and began….
When asked why February 23 became Red Army Day (from 1949-1993 – Day of the Soviet Army and Navy), any Soviet schoolboy could answer easily and without stumbling: it was the day that the newly formed Red Army troops won their first victory over the Germans. Or, according to the “Short History of the Communist Party,” it was when “the young squads of the new army – the army of a revolutionary people – had their first heroic victory against the German predator. Outside of Narva and Pskov the German occupiers were strongly resisted. Their advance was halted at Petrograd.”
These days, everyone who is interested in history knows that Comrade Stalin distorted the facts in this case. Pskov was occupied by the Germans on February 24 with virtually no resistance. Narva fell on March 3, although the revolutionary Dybenko detachment, which was sent to protect the city, left a shameful position and “retreated” right up to Samara.
Furthermore, in 2004 late Deputy of the Duma Yushenkov in agreement with Russian Television Commentator/Respected Author; M.L. Mlechim and many others proposed the idea, both in the hallowed halls of the Duma and on television, that these retreats were a disgrace to the history of Russia. The men would go on to state that not only was the retreat itself despicable but the actions of one Pavel Dybenko was particularly disturbing. According to them, Dybenko was a coward and a drunk who favored retreat than battle. This they said was also based from archival material. Dybenko’s current reputation as an in-experienced leader of drunken disorderly groups of sailors and a coward who favored retreat rather than battle is the myth propagated throughout.
For many historians of Russian history, the understanding of Dybenko and his actions during February 23rd rely heavily on Lenin and Trotsky’s Governments case against him in May of 1918. Although the accusations as presented by Krylenko were to be discredited, the underlying motivation was accomplished. Very simply, after only four hours of deliberation, President Berman and the Tribunal found Dybenko not guilty and acquitted him of all charges. What then did this bringing Dybenko to trial on charges that held no merit accomplish? Defense Attorney Shtienberg was on record as saying, “Dybenko grew to become increasingly dangerous and the sole purpose of this case was to eliminate him from the political arena”. Alexsandra Kollontai stated, “She felt Dybenko had been betrayed”. “Narva”, she said, “was not the actual reason for his arrest”. If one considers Shteinberg’s and Kollontai’s statements, the relevant questions develop into; Why would Pavel Dybenko be politically dangerous to the likes of Lenin and Trotsky? Why was it important to eliminate Dybenko from the political arena?
Answering these questions is made difficult in part because of the lack of historical record. The official case file of Dybenko’s trial in May of 1918 was either destroyed or continues to be unavailable. (Dybenko's May trial file recently found) Dybenko’s own biographers and even his early works all end short of the actual events. Many of the books about the October revolution published in Russia during the Soviet era don’t mention Dybenko’s name at all or describe the events that he was involved in very selectively. Like for example several articles from the Historical-and-Military magazine publication either omit the Narva episode altogether or mention it real briefly, just stating in one sentence that Dybenko and his detachment took part in the Narva’s defensive operation and that’s it, without giving any details of the operation and its consequences.
It should be noted that the “Case file of Admiral Shchastny” which happened one month later in June of 1918 is available for historians to examine. Moreover one could sit for hours at the Russian Naval Archives and go through three-foot high stacks of material and one would not find a word on Dybenko’s trial nor the battle of Narva. At first, further inspection yielded little or no additional information.
There are a nominal number of books written which discuss Dybenko, Tsentrobalt, and the sailor’s activities.
In the book, “The sailors of the Baltic Fleet in 1917” written by A.V. Bogdanov and published in 1955, Dybenko is not mentioned at all, as if he never existed or was too insignificant. Tsentrobalt is, on the contrary, discussed throughout.
In another, “The heroic deeds of the Baltic Sailors in 1918” by V.I. Sapozhikov published in 1954, it is less surprising Pavel Dybenko’s name and his role not just at the Narva operation but also in the Baltic fleet altogether are absolutely absent from the book. Importance and undeniable authority of the Tsentrobalt, which was the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet, is stressed and underlined all through the book. It’s leader and chairman, Pavel Dybenko, however remains unmentioned.
In the book “Under Pskov and Narva, February 1918” written by A.I. Cherepanov and published in 1957 one would expect to finally come across some information concerning Dybenko’s incident at Narva as this whole book is devoted solely to the description of events that took place preceding, during and following the Narva’s defense operation. The author dwells on the causes and the consequences of the war for the young Soviet state and of the general political situation in Russia. He provides a complete list of the military detachments involved on both sides, depicts the battles, moves of both armies, etc. Our expectations are finally justified….but not much. Out of 140 pages of the book of the Narva and Pskov defense operation history only a little passage mentions Pavel Dybenko. The information is very scarce and compressed.
To dispel the myth of February 23rd and to answer the questions…Why would Pavel Dybenko be politically dangerous to the likes of Lenin and Trotsky? Why was it important to eliminate Dybenko from the political arena?...one must follow the ensuing study on the relationship between the early Soviet Government and Tsentrobalt between the time of Great October and May 1918. The outcome of the investigation reveals a struggle of political will between Vladimir Lenin the head of the “Bolshevik” party and Pavel Dybenko, the Chairman of Tsentrobalt.
Investigation of the historical record via archival research, numerous books on the era, and newspaper accounts exposes a story known to few, involving the actions of many if not all of the early leading Russian theorists and political figures. A faction of these men led by Lenin, inebriated with their new found power began to destroy the gains of social justice that defined Great October….a people’s popular uprising and revolution. Lenin’s “coup” and move toward complete dictatorship would happen in March of 1918…utilizing the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and the alleged events of Narva, Lenin will eradicate all opposition to his authority by removing all dissenting members of the Central Commiittee and more importantly remove his perceived military threat from Dybenko. Prior to February 23 Pavel Dybenko showed himself “unreliable” to the leading political power structure as he continued to maintain independence for the fleet and was surely attracted to defending October’s harvest.
This stance by Pavel Dybenko posed a political threat not rooted in minor disagreement or power struggles but in a populist and democratic vision for the Russian people that conflicted with the aims of Lenin’s faction of the Bolsheviki. Historical instances between Great October and February 23rd bear out Dybenko’s unwillingness to tow the party line and become subordinate to Lenin
In this writing I put forward that Dybenko’s court martial and later exclusion from positions of political influence arose from these political differences. Dybenko was too independent, willing to sacrifice Lenin and Trotsky, plus had the personal magnetism to attract followers
Decades apart, G.P. Maximoff and Noam Chomsky came to similar conclusions concerning the aims of Lenin’s faction of the Bolshevik Government, “the first things Lenin and his associates did upon taking power was to begin to destroy the soviets”.
Dybenko, the Russian Navy and its Soviet Tsentrobalt would also become a target. The “armed fist of the revolution” had to be broken, and like all things in Russia become subordinate to the Executive Committee and its Dictatorship of the People. A conflict between Lenin’s “opportunistic vanguardism” and Dybenko’s understanding of “representative government” was inevitable.
The written word of Dybenko being disloyal and someone not to be trusted can be found in the political spin of the Boshevik leaders. This includes the events of Narva. By reviewing the following examples of alleged insubordination by Dybenko and the alleged actions on the part of the politically powerful one can track the path of reaction and actions meant to harm Pavel Dybenko.
Deployment of personnel and ships during Great October
“The time has come to show how to die for the revolution! For it is better to die for freedom and dignity than to live without either.”
P.E. Dybenko
An Insurrection is impossible without the forces of the Baltic Fleet.
V. Lenin
During the early hours of Great October and from Petrograd Lenin contacts via the wire Sheinman, chairman of the Helsingfors Soviet of Soldiers, Sailors, and Workers Deputies, and orders him to immediately have ships and submarines deployed to Petrograd. In reply, Sheinman stated he would have to get “Dybenko” on the wire since Lenin’s order was a naval question.
Not pleased, Lenin tries to convince Sheinman of the necessity of his request stating that Kerensky’s forces are fast approaching and have taken Gatchina, and as some of the Petrograd troops are exhausted we are in urgent need of strong reinforcements.
Lenin ended with “I expected you to say you were ready to come and fight”
Chairman Sheinman calmly responded, “It seems useless to me to repeat that. We have made our decision and consequently everything will be done”.
Unrelenting, Lenin contacts Izmailov, Deputy Chairman of Tsentrobalt, continuing in his attempts to direct the Navy by calling for “battleships to enter the Ships Canal!” Izmailov had to explain to Lenin that battleships are large vessels and cannot safely anchor in the Canal, he continues on the abilities of the ships…then with assurance recommends; “in short let the sailors and their command handle this.”
Chairman Sheiman speaks to the trust in Dybenko’s leadership and Izmailov symbolized the independence and confidence of Tsentrobalt.
If Lenin and his Executive Committee did not control the fleet’s actions: is it true the fleet was an element of “Lenin’s Bolshevik” party? Indubitably Lenin would have to work on the “political problem involving insubordination of the Baltic fleet”.
Not surprisingly, the powerful circle of Lenins’ faction of the Bolsheviks opposed the upright agreement between Pavel Dybenko and the Cossacks at Gatchina Palace.
The following recounts the events.
The Krasnov agreement—Great October
“Do you know whether it is true that Dybenko is here?,,,He is my enemy”
Alexander Kerensky, Head of the Provisional Government
The guards take Dybenko to the barrack where the Cossacks are resting. Dybenko asks if Kerensky is there and suggests guarding him in case he decides to flee. He speaks before the Cossacks for several hours about the betrayal of the Provisional government and about the new people’s power represented by the Soviets of workers, soldiers and sailors. He tries to convince them that they are the same working people as workers or sailors and that the new power will express their interests rather then interests of rich capitalists. He tells them about the new decrees of the Soviet government to stop the war and achieve the peace, to save the country from total destruction and give all the land to peasants, to establish control over the industry, to ban capital punishment in the military. By 8 o’clock in the morning he manages to convince the Cossacks to stop fighting and to arrest Kerensky. They agree on the condition that they have to get the approval of the Cossacks’ committee.
The Cossack Chairman proposed consideration of clause № 11 declaring that Lenin and Trotsky withdraw from government and abstain from any public activity until they have cleared themselves of the charge of having worked for the enemy. General Woytinsky witnesses the proceedings and observed ten Cossack representatives sitting on one side of a long table facing two sailors. Woytinsky recalled, “One of the latter was a big, strikingly handsome man, the notorious Dybenko, the ringleader of the Baltic Fleet”.
In the end Dybenko will agree to clause № 11 the last clause in an eleven point Cossack/Dybenko accord, otherwise known as the Krasnov Agreement. The truce agreement was amazingly fair and one that many saw as favorable to the Cossacks.
As you would have thought, the agreement was based on the understanding a coalition (soviet) government would be formed.
Clearly, Dybenko’s negotiations did not sit well with the politically dominant, Lenin is furious…Lenin demands Dybenko be court-martialed: Podvoiskii and others are in agreement. Interesting enough Dybenko is not court-martialed…yet.
Even though, as stated above, the Cossacks proposed clause № 11, a faction of the Bolsheviki leaders put forth the perception that Dybenko, perhaps only as a joke, found it possible to propose to Krasnov’s Cossacks, to exchange Kerensky for Lenin. Or that a ‘wily’ Dybenko had after some fighting offered to hand over Lenin to Krasnov’s Cossacks in exchange for Kerensky!
The viewpoint of Lenin and his faction of the Bolsheviki will be that Dybenko over extended his authority; he wasn’t authorized to come to an agreement with the Cossacks. The Soviet of the People’s Commissars declined to ratify the treaty, negotiated and signed by Dybenko. Declaring, Dybenko had the authority to arrange a cease-fire but did not have support to arrange a peace agreement with the Cossacks. The treaty is to be considered canceled
The potential obstacle to new policy had been revealed…
The two aforementioned incidences recount the fleet’s leadership…one which held unsympathetic attitudes toward Lenin’s directives then followed by Dybenko negotiating a truly democratic peace. Together these actions demonstrate the tone of the fleet’s attitude regarding its relationship with political leaders. Lenin will begin the task to reassign the power structure of the fleet and calls for a meeting with the sailors. The following events including the Sailor’s Congress adds fuel to an already burning flame.
The First All-Russian Naval Congress—1917 November 18-25
A meeting between delegates of the Navy are summoned less than a month after Great October…the outcome will determine the fate of Tsentrobalt. During the fourth day of the Congress Lenin addresses the sailors. On the agenda of the First All-Russian Naval Congress were questions concerning the activity of the Central Committee of the Navy and to introduce reforms in the Navy Department.
“The Congress’, Lenin said, “has to pass some serious resolutions dealing with raising the level of discipline, appointing commissars to every ship, dismissing the elective system of commanding staff. and other restrictive measures.”
There were “rumours” that the fleet was unorganized and in disarray. Yet at the congress Lenin beamed one could not deny the fact that the fleet was “operating independently and had created a new order…a brilliant example of practical government”
Lenin finishes his speech at the Congress and charges the sailors to support the revolution and Soviet Power.
With the knowledge that the trusted Dybenko would head any new administrative structure the naval congress agrees to transfer command of fleets and flotillas into the hands of the central committees of fleets and flotillas. The congress also adopts a resolution regarding this new administrative organization for the Navy, thereby forming the Supreme Naval Collegium, whose members were to include P. E. Dybenko as Chairman, M. V. Ivanov, F. F. Raskol’nikov, and V. V. Koval’skii.
Furthermore, during the congress Lenin will experience first hand the devotion and respect the sailors provide Dybenko. During the last session of the Naval Congress, the delegates were honoring men who had performed heroically during Great October by awarding these brave men new rank.
The ending question of the session discussed recognizing the service of Pavel Dybenko in the fight for the attainment of Soviet Power. In unity the delegates affirm the decision to honor Dybenko by awarding him the highest naval military rank available, an Admiral
At the podium Dybenko replied, “I want to thank you for all the attention though I ask you allow me to make a suggestion, I began this fight in the rank of a conscript sailor and as you see I have already been promoted to the rank of free citizen of the Soviet Republic, which for me is the highest rank available. Allow me to continue my service in this rank.”
The Congress exploded with applauds and loud hoorah’s…the ovation lasted for a very long time.
“Pavel Dybenko was exceptionally charming,’ a former soldier of the 3rd Kronshtadt regiment recalled, “Even now I can still picture him standing in front of me. A well built tall sailor, about twenty-eight years old, with lively black eyes and a small beard. I can still see his contagious smile.
The Marriage to Kollontai
I came to know Pavel Dybenko as being passionate, steadfast, and totally decisive, the soul of the Tsentrobalt, firm and determined.
Alexsandra Kollontai
We’ll have a Red wedding…..” They registered a civil marriage in the middle of November. “The record of my marriage with Pavel Dybenko”, remembers later Alexsandra Mikhailovna, “starts the new Book of Records of Civil State Acts in the Soviet country”.
Kollontai had been one of Lenin’s few advocates during the year 1917. She participated in the RSDWP conference in 1903 and played an active role in discussions of political will. At many meetings Kollontai stressed the importance of addressing concerns of the Russian female. She spoke constantly to workers groups, woman’s groups, and the men of the armed forces. It is by her political agitation that Kollontai would meet Dybenko. On that day the twinkle of Kollontai’s eyes no longer belonged to Lenin. According to Kollontai, Dybenko was everything that represented free will.
As member of the council of Commissars in October 1917, Commissar of Public Welfare Alexsandra Kollontai was the woman with the highest revolutionary profile. Her marriage to Pavel Dybenko, the then Military and Naval Commissar, was commonly referred to as the romance of the revolution. Dismayed but not deterred Lenin was effecting a plan that would see Pavel Dybenko dead or in the least discredited to a point of his removal from government.
As for Kollontai, Lenin’s longtime confidant, a turned back and the continued disparaging of her husband became predictable. Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership began describing Dybenko as a comrade of radical and unpredictable views, and Kollontai’s involvement with him lost her the confidence she previously enjoyed.
Nevertheless, Kollontai believed as did Dybenko a new dawn had arrived, that anything was possible, and both held close to their hearts the social triumphs of Great October
Complications between Dybenko and Lenin continue
The politically powerful are treated to another act of “defiance” by Dybenko and this time in plays out on the stage of the Constituent Assembly.
…Earlier that evening As Lenin was preparing to leave the Constituent Assembly he wrote an order…“Do not disperse the Constituent Assembly until today’s session is over”, the order went on to read, “Don’t let anybody in Tavrichski Palace tomorrow morning”.
Dybenko revoke his command. Without success, Lenin reiterates his order to the sailor Zheleznyakov, an attempt to supersede that of Dybenko’s. Zheleznyakov reports to Dybenko the order Lenin gave meant to substitute his. Dybenko shrugs off Lenin’s order and suggests Zheleznyakov to go ahead and close the Assembly. Zheleznyakov asks, “What will happen to me if I don’t fulfill Lenin’s order?” To which Dybenko responds, “Disperse the Assembly and we’ll deal with it tomorrow.” Pavel Dybenko believed the Constituent Assembly was dispersed not on the day of it’s opening, but on October 25th, the sailor Zheleznyakov just executed the order of the October Revolution.
N. Krupskaya recalls in “Reminiscences of Lenin” a confrontation occurred between Lenin and Dybenko, in an entirely separate affair The following account is just another of numerous examples intended to pour scorn upon Dybenko.
…We sat drinking tea, talking to the different comrades who came in. I remember Kollontai and Dybenko among others. The sitting opened at 4 p.m. On his way to the hall Ilyich reminded himself that he had left his revolver in his overcoat pocket. He went back for it, but the revolver wasn't there, although no strangers had entered the apartment. Obviously one of the guards had removed it. Ilyich rebuked Dybenko for the lack of discipline among the guards. Dybenko was very upset. When Ilyich came back from the meeting hall Dybenko handed him his revolver, which the guard had returned.
Still another example of belittling Dybenko came to pass when in January of 1918, a German delegation arrived in Petrograd. Count Kaiserling chaperoned by Trotsky visited Petrograd as part of an official German International Relations assemblage is introduced to Ministers of the Government. After an introduction to Dybenko, the Minister of Marines, Count Kaiserling was said to exclaim: “Is it possible that this is the Minister of Marines? He cannot speak two words.
He is perhaps a brave man, but for a minister he is altogether impossible. It is the strength of the plebeian. It cannot be.”
The Birth of the Red Army
On the 15th of January the decree entitled, ‘The Scheme for a Socialist Army’ declared the formation of the Red Army and was signed not only by Pavel Dybenko but also by Podvoiskii and Lenin. Many years later in 1921, A. Oeuvre interviewed Trotsky who acknowledged the authentication of the decree.
Part of the whole was a document entitled ‘The Democritazation of the Navy’ instituting the reorganization of the fleet. Authored by Pavel Dybenko, the document speaks to the independence of the fleet along with other rights such as assembly, speech, and freedom of religion.
“All sailors of the Navy have the right to be members of any political, national, religious, economic, or professional organization, society or union. They have the right, freely and openly, to express and profess by word or mouth, in writing or in print, their political, religious, and other views.”
Furthermore, news outlets around the world declared; provisions for election by the universal suffrage of the sailors for the entire commanding personnel of the Russian navy is contained in the decree issued by Dybenko last Friday in his “for the democratization of the navy.”
Also, all sailors are to bear titles corresponding with their posts, such as commander engineer, and commander gunner. All appointments are to be confirmed by a central naval committee. Committees of the commanding personnel are to have the right to demand the removal of elected commanders, but the latter may appeal to the central committee.
The democratic minded Dybenko is sanctioned and Lenin’s response is swift as he authors;
The decision to remove Dybenko from power has been sealed. Lenin, V. Bonch-Bruyevitch, Dzerzhinsky and others plan an act of terror so heinous…resulting in the discrediting of Pavel Dybenko and the revolutionary sailors.
by George Levy
especially for PoliSMI
Part 1
Pavel Dybenko speaks to the Revolutionary Tribunal
May 1918
The current understanding of February 23rd maintains an unjustified myth and detracts the Russian populace from coming to know a true and accurate account of the aftermath of revolution and the consequences that followed. What we do know about this time…V. Lenin and V. Bonch-Bruyevitch have told us and therefore the subsequent perception is a result of this “truth”
How Russia and the World Views February 23rd
On February 24, 2009 Evgeny Levin’s article The Red Army-Strongest of All, published in The Russia Mir, well represents the mindset of February 23 and began….
When asked why February 23 became Red Army Day (from 1949-1993 – Day of the Soviet Army and Navy), any Soviet schoolboy could answer easily and without stumbling: it was the day that the newly formed Red Army troops won their first victory over the Germans. Or, according to the “Short History of the Communist Party,” it was when “the young squads of the new army – the army of a revolutionary people – had their first heroic victory against the German predator. Outside of Narva and Pskov the German occupiers were strongly resisted. Their advance was halted at Petrograd.”
These days, everyone who is interested in history knows that Comrade Stalin distorted the facts in this case. Pskov was occupied by the Germans on February 24 with virtually no resistance. Narva fell on March 3, although the revolutionary Dybenko detachment, which was sent to protect the city, left a shameful position and “retreated” right up to Samara.
Furthermore, in 2004 late Deputy of the Duma Yushenkov in agreement with Russian Television Commentator/Respected Author; M.L. Mlechim and many others proposed the idea, both in the hallowed halls of the Duma and on television, that these retreats were a disgrace to the history of Russia. The men would go on to state that not only was the retreat itself despicable but the actions of one Pavel Dybenko was particularly disturbing. According to them, Dybenko was a coward and a drunk who favored retreat than battle. This they said was also based from archival material. Dybenko’s current reputation as an in-experienced leader of drunken disorderly groups of sailors and a coward who favored retreat rather than battle is the myth propagated throughout.
For many historians of Russian history, the understanding of Dybenko and his actions during February 23rd rely heavily on Lenin and Trotsky’s Governments case against him in May of 1918. Although the accusations as presented by Krylenko were to be discredited, the underlying motivation was accomplished. Very simply, after only four hours of deliberation, President Berman and the Tribunal found Dybenko not guilty and acquitted him of all charges. What then did this bringing Dybenko to trial on charges that held no merit accomplish? Defense Attorney Shtienberg was on record as saying, “Dybenko grew to become increasingly dangerous and the sole purpose of this case was to eliminate him from the political arena”. Alexsandra Kollontai stated, “She felt Dybenko had been betrayed”. “Narva”, she said, “was not the actual reason for his arrest”. If one considers Shteinberg’s and Kollontai’s statements, the relevant questions develop into; Why would Pavel Dybenko be politically dangerous to the likes of Lenin and Trotsky? Why was it important to eliminate Dybenko from the political arena?
Answering these questions is made difficult in part because of the lack of historical record. The official case file of Dybenko’s trial in May of 1918 was either destroyed or continues to be unavailable. (Dybenko's May trial file recently found) Dybenko’s own biographers and even his early works all end short of the actual events. Many of the books about the October revolution published in Russia during the Soviet era don’t mention Dybenko’s name at all or describe the events that he was involved in very selectively. Like for example several articles from the Historical-and-Military magazine publication either omit the Narva episode altogether or mention it real briefly, just stating in one sentence that Dybenko and his detachment took part in the Narva’s defensive operation and that’s it, without giving any details of the operation and its consequences.
It should be noted that the “Case file of Admiral Shchastny” which happened one month later in June of 1918 is available for historians to examine. Moreover one could sit for hours at the Russian Naval Archives and go through three-foot high stacks of material and one would not find a word on Dybenko’s trial nor the battle of Narva. At first, further inspection yielded little or no additional information.
There are a nominal number of books written which discuss Dybenko, Tsentrobalt, and the sailor’s activities.
In the book, “The sailors of the Baltic Fleet in 1917” written by A.V. Bogdanov and published in 1955, Dybenko is not mentioned at all, as if he never existed or was too insignificant. Tsentrobalt is, on the contrary, discussed throughout.
In another, “The heroic deeds of the Baltic Sailors in 1918” by V.I. Sapozhikov published in 1954, it is less surprising Pavel Dybenko’s name and his role not just at the Narva operation but also in the Baltic fleet altogether are absolutely absent from the book. Importance and undeniable authority of the Tsentrobalt, which was the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet, is stressed and underlined all through the book. It’s leader and chairman, Pavel Dybenko, however remains unmentioned.
In the book “Under Pskov and Narva, February 1918” written by A.I. Cherepanov and published in 1957 one would expect to finally come across some information concerning Dybenko’s incident at Narva as this whole book is devoted solely to the description of events that took place preceding, during and following the Narva’s defense operation. The author dwells on the causes and the consequences of the war for the young Soviet state and of the general political situation in Russia. He provides a complete list of the military detachments involved on both sides, depicts the battles, moves of both armies, etc. Our expectations are finally justified….but not much. Out of 140 pages of the book of the Narva and Pskov defense operation history only a little passage mentions Pavel Dybenko. The information is very scarce and compressed.
To dispel the myth of February 23rd and to answer the questions…Why would Pavel Dybenko be politically dangerous to the likes of Lenin and Trotsky? Why was it important to eliminate Dybenko from the political arena?...one must follow the ensuing study on the relationship between the early Soviet Government and Tsentrobalt between the time of Great October and May 1918. The outcome of the investigation reveals a struggle of political will between Vladimir Lenin the head of the “Bolshevik” party and Pavel Dybenko, the Chairman of Tsentrobalt.
Investigation of the historical record via archival research, numerous books on the era, and newspaper accounts exposes a story known to few, involving the actions of many if not all of the early leading Russian theorists and political figures. A faction of these men led by Lenin, inebriated with their new found power began to destroy the gains of social justice that defined Great October….a people’s popular uprising and revolution. Lenin’s “coup” and move toward complete dictatorship would happen in March of 1918…utilizing the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and the alleged events of Narva, Lenin will eradicate all opposition to his authority by removing all dissenting members of the Central Commiittee and more importantly remove his perceived military threat from Dybenko. Prior to February 23 Pavel Dybenko showed himself “unreliable” to the leading political power structure as he continued to maintain independence for the fleet and was surely attracted to defending October’s harvest.
This stance by Pavel Dybenko posed a political threat not rooted in minor disagreement or power struggles but in a populist and democratic vision for the Russian people that conflicted with the aims of Lenin’s faction of the Bolsheviki. Historical instances between Great October and February 23rd bear out Dybenko’s unwillingness to tow the party line and become subordinate to Lenin
In this writing I put forward that Dybenko’s court martial and later exclusion from positions of political influence arose from these political differences. Dybenko was too independent, willing to sacrifice Lenin and Trotsky, plus had the personal magnetism to attract followers
Decades apart, G.P. Maximoff and Noam Chomsky came to similar conclusions concerning the aims of Lenin’s faction of the Bolshevik Government, “the first things Lenin and his associates did upon taking power was to begin to destroy the soviets”.
Dybenko, the Russian Navy and its Soviet Tsentrobalt would also become a target. The “armed fist of the revolution” had to be broken, and like all things in Russia become subordinate to the Executive Committee and its Dictatorship of the People. A conflict between Lenin’s “opportunistic vanguardism” and Dybenko’s understanding of “representative government” was inevitable.
The written word of Dybenko being disloyal and someone not to be trusted can be found in the political spin of the Boshevik leaders. This includes the events of Narva. By reviewing the following examples of alleged insubordination by Dybenko and the alleged actions on the part of the politically powerful one can track the path of reaction and actions meant to harm Pavel Dybenko.
Deployment of personnel and ships during Great October
“The time has come to show how to die for the revolution! For it is better to die for freedom and dignity than to live without either.”
P.E. Dybenko
An Insurrection is impossible without the forces of the Baltic Fleet.
V. Lenin
During the early hours of Great October and from Petrograd Lenin contacts via the wire Sheinman, chairman of the Helsingfors Soviet of Soldiers, Sailors, and Workers Deputies, and orders him to immediately have ships and submarines deployed to Petrograd. In reply, Sheinman stated he would have to get “Dybenko” on the wire since Lenin’s order was a naval question.
Not pleased, Lenin tries to convince Sheinman of the necessity of his request stating that Kerensky’s forces are fast approaching and have taken Gatchina, and as some of the Petrograd troops are exhausted we are in urgent need of strong reinforcements.
Lenin ended with “I expected you to say you were ready to come and fight”
Chairman Sheinman calmly responded, “It seems useless to me to repeat that. We have made our decision and consequently everything will be done”.
Unrelenting, Lenin contacts Izmailov, Deputy Chairman of Tsentrobalt, continuing in his attempts to direct the Navy by calling for “battleships to enter the Ships Canal!” Izmailov had to explain to Lenin that battleships are large vessels and cannot safely anchor in the Canal, he continues on the abilities of the ships…then with assurance recommends; “in short let the sailors and their command handle this.”
Chairman Sheiman speaks to the trust in Dybenko’s leadership and Izmailov symbolized the independence and confidence of Tsentrobalt.
If Lenin and his Executive Committee did not control the fleet’s actions: is it true the fleet was an element of “Lenin’s Bolshevik” party? Indubitably Lenin would have to work on the “political problem involving insubordination of the Baltic fleet”.
Not surprisingly, the powerful circle of Lenins’ faction of the Bolsheviks opposed the upright agreement between Pavel Dybenko and the Cossacks at Gatchina Palace.
The following recounts the events.
The Krasnov agreement—Great October
“Do you know whether it is true that Dybenko is here?,,,He is my enemy”
Alexander Kerensky, Head of the Provisional Government
The guards take Dybenko to the barrack where the Cossacks are resting. Dybenko asks if Kerensky is there and suggests guarding him in case he decides to flee. He speaks before the Cossacks for several hours about the betrayal of the Provisional government and about the new people’s power represented by the Soviets of workers, soldiers and sailors. He tries to convince them that they are the same working people as workers or sailors and that the new power will express their interests rather then interests of rich capitalists. He tells them about the new decrees of the Soviet government to stop the war and achieve the peace, to save the country from total destruction and give all the land to peasants, to establish control over the industry, to ban capital punishment in the military. By 8 o’clock in the morning he manages to convince the Cossacks to stop fighting and to arrest Kerensky. They agree on the condition that they have to get the approval of the Cossacks’ committee.
The Cossack Chairman proposed consideration of clause № 11 declaring that Lenin and Trotsky withdraw from government and abstain from any public activity until they have cleared themselves of the charge of having worked for the enemy. General Woytinsky witnesses the proceedings and observed ten Cossack representatives sitting on one side of a long table facing two sailors. Woytinsky recalled, “One of the latter was a big, strikingly handsome man, the notorious Dybenko, the ringleader of the Baltic Fleet”.
In the end Dybenko will agree to clause № 11 the last clause in an eleven point Cossack/Dybenko accord, otherwise known as the Krasnov Agreement. The truce agreement was amazingly fair and one that many saw as favorable to the Cossacks.
As you would have thought, the agreement was based on the understanding a coalition (soviet) government would be formed.
Clearly, Dybenko’s negotiations did not sit well with the politically dominant, Lenin is furious…Lenin demands Dybenko be court-martialed: Podvoiskii and others are in agreement. Interesting enough Dybenko is not court-martialed…yet.
Even though, as stated above, the Cossacks proposed clause № 11, a faction of the Bolsheviki leaders put forth the perception that Dybenko, perhaps only as a joke, found it possible to propose to Krasnov’s Cossacks, to exchange Kerensky for Lenin. Or that a ‘wily’ Dybenko had after some fighting offered to hand over Lenin to Krasnov’s Cossacks in exchange for Kerensky!
The viewpoint of Lenin and his faction of the Bolsheviki will be that Dybenko over extended his authority; he wasn’t authorized to come to an agreement with the Cossacks. The Soviet of the People’s Commissars declined to ratify the treaty, negotiated and signed by Dybenko. Declaring, Dybenko had the authority to arrange a cease-fire but did not have support to arrange a peace agreement with the Cossacks. The treaty is to be considered canceled
The potential obstacle to new policy had been revealed…
The two aforementioned incidences recount the fleet’s leadership…one which held unsympathetic attitudes toward Lenin’s directives then followed by Dybenko negotiating a truly democratic peace. Together these actions demonstrate the tone of the fleet’s attitude regarding its relationship with political leaders. Lenin will begin the task to reassign the power structure of the fleet and calls for a meeting with the sailors. The following events including the Sailor’s Congress adds fuel to an already burning flame.
The First All-Russian Naval Congress—1917 November 18-25
A meeting between delegates of the Navy are summoned less than a month after Great October…the outcome will determine the fate of Tsentrobalt. During the fourth day of the Congress Lenin addresses the sailors. On the agenda of the First All-Russian Naval Congress were questions concerning the activity of the Central Committee of the Navy and to introduce reforms in the Navy Department.
“The Congress’, Lenin said, “has to pass some serious resolutions dealing with raising the level of discipline, appointing commissars to every ship, dismissing the elective system of commanding staff. and other restrictive measures.”
There were “rumours” that the fleet was unorganized and in disarray. Yet at the congress Lenin beamed one could not deny the fact that the fleet was “operating independently and had created a new order…a brilliant example of practical government”
Lenin finishes his speech at the Congress and charges the sailors to support the revolution and Soviet Power.
With the knowledge that the trusted Dybenko would head any new administrative structure the naval congress agrees to transfer command of fleets and flotillas into the hands of the central committees of fleets and flotillas. The congress also adopts a resolution regarding this new administrative organization for the Navy, thereby forming the Supreme Naval Collegium, whose members were to include P. E. Dybenko as Chairman, M. V. Ivanov, F. F. Raskol’nikov, and V. V. Koval’skii.
Furthermore, during the congress Lenin will experience first hand the devotion and respect the sailors provide Dybenko. During the last session of the Naval Congress, the delegates were honoring men who had performed heroically during Great October by awarding these brave men new rank.
The ending question of the session discussed recognizing the service of Pavel Dybenko in the fight for the attainment of Soviet Power. In unity the delegates affirm the decision to honor Dybenko by awarding him the highest naval military rank available, an Admiral
At the podium Dybenko replied, “I want to thank you for all the attention though I ask you allow me to make a suggestion, I began this fight in the rank of a conscript sailor and as you see I have already been promoted to the rank of free citizen of the Soviet Republic, which for me is the highest rank available. Allow me to continue my service in this rank.”
The Congress exploded with applauds and loud hoorah’s…the ovation lasted for a very long time.
“Pavel Dybenko was exceptionally charming,’ a former soldier of the 3rd Kronshtadt regiment recalled, “Even now I can still picture him standing in front of me. A well built tall sailor, about twenty-eight years old, with lively black eyes and a small beard. I can still see his contagious smile.
The Marriage to Kollontai
I came to know Pavel Dybenko as being passionate, steadfast, and totally decisive, the soul of the Tsentrobalt, firm and determined.
Alexsandra Kollontai
We’ll have a Red wedding…..” They registered a civil marriage in the middle of November. “The record of my marriage with Pavel Dybenko”, remembers later Alexsandra Mikhailovna, “starts the new Book of Records of Civil State Acts in the Soviet country”.
Kollontai had been one of Lenin’s few advocates during the year 1917. She participated in the RSDWP conference in 1903 and played an active role in discussions of political will. At many meetings Kollontai stressed the importance of addressing concerns of the Russian female. She spoke constantly to workers groups, woman’s groups, and the men of the armed forces. It is by her political agitation that Kollontai would meet Dybenko. On that day the twinkle of Kollontai’s eyes no longer belonged to Lenin. According to Kollontai, Dybenko was everything that represented free will.
As member of the council of Commissars in October 1917, Commissar of Public Welfare Alexsandra Kollontai was the woman with the highest revolutionary profile. Her marriage to Pavel Dybenko, the then Military and Naval Commissar, was commonly referred to as the romance of the revolution. Dismayed but not deterred Lenin was effecting a plan that would see Pavel Dybenko dead or in the least discredited to a point of his removal from government.
As for Kollontai, Lenin’s longtime confidant, a turned back and the continued disparaging of her husband became predictable. Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership began describing Dybenko as a comrade of radical and unpredictable views, and Kollontai’s involvement with him lost her the confidence she previously enjoyed.
Nevertheless, Kollontai believed as did Dybenko a new dawn had arrived, that anything was possible, and both held close to their hearts the social triumphs of Great October
Complications between Dybenko and Lenin continue
The politically powerful are treated to another act of “defiance” by Dybenko and this time in plays out on the stage of the Constituent Assembly.
…Earlier that evening As Lenin was preparing to leave the Constituent Assembly he wrote an order…“Do not disperse the Constituent Assembly until today’s session is over”, the order went on to read, “Don’t let anybody in Tavrichski Palace tomorrow morning”.
Meanwhile, Tsentrobalt lieutenant Zheleznyakov approached Dybenko and reported,
“The sailors are tired, they want to sleep”
Zheleznyakov then asked, “What should we do?”
Dybenko gave the order to disperse the Constituent Assembly after the
People’s Commissars have left the Palace. Lenin found out about this
order and was incensed. Lenin confronted Dybenko and demanded the order
be cancelled. Dybenko responds, “Can you, Vladimir Ilyich, guarantee
that no sailor’s head will fall down in the streets of Petrograd
tomorrow?”
Lenin fuming approaches Kollontai and seeks her cooperation to encourageDybenko revoke his command. Without success, Lenin reiterates his order to the sailor Zheleznyakov, an attempt to supersede that of Dybenko’s. Zheleznyakov reports to Dybenko the order Lenin gave meant to substitute his. Dybenko shrugs off Lenin’s order and suggests Zheleznyakov to go ahead and close the Assembly. Zheleznyakov asks, “What will happen to me if I don’t fulfill Lenin’s order?” To which Dybenko responds, “Disperse the Assembly and we’ll deal with it tomorrow.” Pavel Dybenko believed the Constituent Assembly was dispersed not on the day of it’s opening, but on October 25th, the sailor Zheleznyakov just executed the order of the October Revolution.
N. Krupskaya recalls in “Reminiscences of Lenin” a confrontation occurred between Lenin and Dybenko, in an entirely separate affair The following account is just another of numerous examples intended to pour scorn upon Dybenko.
…We sat drinking tea, talking to the different comrades who came in. I remember Kollontai and Dybenko among others. The sitting opened at 4 p.m. On his way to the hall Ilyich reminded himself that he had left his revolver in his overcoat pocket. He went back for it, but the revolver wasn't there, although no strangers had entered the apartment. Obviously one of the guards had removed it. Ilyich rebuked Dybenko for the lack of discipline among the guards. Dybenko was very upset. When Ilyich came back from the meeting hall Dybenko handed him his revolver, which the guard had returned.
Still another example of belittling Dybenko came to pass when in January of 1918, a German delegation arrived in Petrograd. Count Kaiserling chaperoned by Trotsky visited Petrograd as part of an official German International Relations assemblage is introduced to Ministers of the Government. After an introduction to Dybenko, the Minister of Marines, Count Kaiserling was said to exclaim: “Is it possible that this is the Minister of Marines? He cannot speak two words.
He is perhaps a brave man, but for a minister he is altogether impossible. It is the strength of the plebeian. It cannot be.”
The Birth of the Red Army
On the 15th of January the decree entitled, ‘The Scheme for a Socialist Army’ declared the formation of the Red Army and was signed not only by Pavel Dybenko but also by Podvoiskii and Lenin. Many years later in 1921, A. Oeuvre interviewed Trotsky who acknowledged the authentication of the decree.
Part of the whole was a document entitled ‘The Democritazation of the Navy’ instituting the reorganization of the fleet. Authored by Pavel Dybenko, the document speaks to the independence of the fleet along with other rights such as assembly, speech, and freedom of religion.
“All sailors of the Navy have the right to be members of any political, national, religious, economic, or professional organization, society or union. They have the right, freely and openly, to express and profess by word or mouth, in writing or in print, their political, religious, and other views.”
Furthermore, news outlets around the world declared; provisions for election by the universal suffrage of the sailors for the entire commanding personnel of the Russian navy is contained in the decree issued by Dybenko last Friday in his “for the democratization of the navy.”
Also, all sailors are to bear titles corresponding with their posts, such as commander engineer, and commander gunner. All appointments are to be confirmed by a central naval committee. Committees of the commanding personnel are to have the right to demand the removal of elected commanders, but the latter may appeal to the central committee.
The democratic minded Dybenko is sanctioned and Lenin’s response is swift as he authors;
‘The Order of Subordination of the Feet’
Considering the wording of the note to § 51.(Democratization of the Fleet)
to be inexact or based on a misunderstanding, since the text, if taken
literally, implies a refusal to recognize the supremacy of the Soviet
state authority. With malevolence, Lenin also threatens to take off the
upcoming agenda Dybenko’s request for allotments toward sailors’
education and for the Naval Ministry.The decision to remove Dybenko from power has been sealed. Lenin, V. Bonch-Bruyevitch, Dzerzhinsky and others plan an act of terror so heinous…resulting in the discrediting of Pavel Dybenko and the revolutionary sailors.
Thursday, June 22, 2017
Great October Series: 1917 The Year of Dybenko Part 3 September through December
The following events propel Dybenko into the
hurricane that would become known as Great October the rise of the Russian
people…
Pavel Dybenko recalled the outcome of the sailors
confrontations with authorities.
“It is
common belief that the Provisional government lost its authority over the
Baltic Fleet only at the end of September 1917 but that is wrong. The authority of the Provisional government
over the Baltic Fleet was lost in fact back in April 1917. The fleet was living its own separate life,
went its own way notwithstanding government policy and even though there were
some hesitations they do not contradict the fact the actual power over the
Baltic Fleet was lost by the government already in April.”
Twelve members of the Central Committee had gathered at
Lenin’s request to decide whether to vote their commitment to a transfer of
power to the Soviet in the immediate future, in other words, to vote for change
against Kerensky’s government soon. Lenin
felt the time was right. At about 10:00 pm on 10 October, Kollontai went to a
Central Committee meeting at the apartment of the left Menshevik Nikolai
Sukhanov.
Nikolai Sukhanov |
His wife, a Bolshevik, had
offered the place to the committee in secrecy.
Unfamiliar with the neighborhood, Kollontai had trouble finding the
apartment, and she came in after the meeting had begun. She noticed that the atmosphere was “awfully
strained.”
The discussion went on into the night.
Lenin felt the time was right.
The Chairman of Tsentrobalt Pavel Dybenko, said that the
fleet was ready.
Trotsky and two delegates from Moscow agreed. Only Zinoviev and Kamenev
counseled caution, fearing another catastrophe like the July Days. When the
vote was finally taken, it fell ten to two in favor of Lenin's position.
"The tension broke immediately," Kollontai wrote. "We felt
hungry. A hot samovar was brought out, we fell upon cheese and sausage."
At dawn Kollontai went home walking through the streets of Petrograd in a mood she later described as "solemnly
serious. Almost reverent. As if you feel a spiritual foreknowledge that you
stand on the threshold of a great hour. It will strike, the end of the old
world. Solemn, serious, reverent, and a little nervous.
October 12th, Dybenko is selected as one of two
delegates representing the Baltic Fleet to the Constitutional Assembly. (The
other is Lenin)
The Election to the Constituent Assembly of 1917
(Dybenko receives more votes than Lenin)
The voting procedure was unique in the Baltic-fleet
district, where each person was allowed to vote for two candidates by
name: this explains the separate figures
for Right and Left SR’s. A breakdown for
the Helsingfors region, including 97 of 100 precincts, is as follows:
Bolsheviks –22,670 for Dybenko
22,237
for Lenin
Left
SR’s 13,617 for Shishko
12,906
for Proshian
Right
SR’s 7,620 for Maslov
7,351
for Tsion
officers 855
for Demchinskii
838
for Rengarten
On October 13th 1917, when speaking to the Petrograd Garrison concerning the question on the relationship of the Military Revolutionary Committee and the Garrison, Dybenko held the chief place in this very significant session. Rightly occupied as Trotsky said, for....
"Dybenko was a man who never had to look in his pocket for a word".
Trotsky |
Additionally Trotsky recalled…“The speech of this Helsingfors guest crashed into the stagnant
atmosphere of the garrison like a keen and fresh sea wind. Dybenko told about the final break of the
fleet with the government and their new attitudes to the command. Before the latest naval operations began, he
said, the admiral addressed a question to the Congress of the Sailors then
sitting: Will they carry out military orders?
We answered: “We will—under the supervision from our side.
But . . .if we see the
fleet is threatened with destruction, the commanding staff will be the first to
hang from the mast head.”
In conclusion,
stimulated by the universal sympathy, Dybenko confidently exclaimed: “They talk
about the need of bringing out the Petrograd garrison for the defense of the
approaches to Petrograd and of Reval in
particular. Don’t believe a word of
it. We will defend Reval ourselves. Stay here and defend the interests of the
revolution…When we need your support we will say so ourselves, and I am
confident that you will support us.”
In preparation for the
revolution, on October 17th, Dybenko signs resolution of
Tsentrobalt to form regular combat troops.
During a plenary meeting of Tsentrobalt, every ship has been ordered to
have a military platoon ready to be at the disposal of Tsentrobalt at any time.
Furthermore the resolution went on requesting the sailors establish control over
all weapons and supplies.
The Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region was held at Petrograd October
21st .
Dr. Alexander Rabinowitch
believes the Congress was for the most part a thundering, highly visible
expression of ultra radical sentiment.
Others might say the Congress was nothing more than a similar
presentation of “All Power to the Soviets”: the message the sailors and Dybenko
tried to communicate in July.
There were similarities, in both circumstances:
Kerensky was called upon to resign, the request for the control of government
transfer into the responsible hands of the All Russian Executive Committee of
Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, with assurance the fleet would
safeguard the move. The
memory of the dark day in August when Kornilov had one whole division blown to
pieces by their own artillery may have provided for stronger tendency toward
peace.
Kerensky and his associates called for the continuation of
war, the extreme supporters of the old guard still held weapons of war, yet the
popular sentiment was against the war and for a peace. The reproach that the Provisional Government
could neither wage war nor conclude peace was a phrase, which Trotsky pled to
his audience. For the implication was
that he, Trotsky and the soviets, were capable of both waging war and
concluding peace. The tactic Trotsky was
adopting was to tap into the two popular sentiments current at the time; one
was the desire to bring the war to an end, and the other was the impulse to
defend the country from German attack, which the Baltic fleet had recently
done.
With that Trotsky introduced Pavel Dybenko as the next
speaker. Dybenko assures the delegates that the fleet would safe guard the
revolution and he addressed the Congress with the following….
“…The Russian Fleet has always stood in the front lines of
the Revolution. The names of its sailors
are written in the book of the history of the struggle against Tsarism. In the earliest days of the Revolution the
sailors marched in the front ranks, our ultimate aim being deliverance from all
misery. And this life and death struggle
with our own oppressors gives us the right to appeal to you, proletarians of all
countries, with a strong voice against the exploiters. Break the chains, you who are oppressed! Rise in revolt! We have nothing to lose but our chains! We believe in the victory of the Revolution,
we are full of this belief. We know that
our comrades in the Revolution will fulfill their duty on the barricades to the
bitter end. We know that decisive
moments are coming. A gigantic struggle
will set the world afire. On the horizon
the fires of the revolt of all oppressed peoples are already glowing and
becoming stronger”.
Lenin addresses the Bolshevik delegates of the forthcoming
Northern Regional Congress:
“We must not wait the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets
which the Central Executive Committee is able to postpone even to
November. We must not delay and let
Kerensky bring in more Kornilov troops.”
Another plenary meeting of Tsentrobalt is called on October
23th. The participants
approve of the 2nd Congress of Soviets that is scheduled to open on
October 25th.
The meetings participants decide: the Baltic fleet “will
support the fight of the Congress for power with all its military forces”.
Dybenko signs the minutes of the plenary meeting of ships
committees and Tsentrobalt on the readiness of the Baltic Fleet to fight for
the Soviet Power. Dybenko’s signature
appears on four different documents issued on October 24th that have
to do with the preparation for the October Revolution.
In those pre-dawn hours of October 23th, when Kerensky
started combat activities by swooping down on the Bolshevik press, two torpedo
boats came into Petersburg
from Helsingfors. They had been sent by the Baltic Fleet to support the
insurrection. Smolny--for the time being--hadn't called them. But the sailors
themselves had sent them, under the pretext of 'greeting the Congress'
The sailors’ control over the radio communication means was
working. The Chairman of Tsentrobalt didn’t allow for Admiral Razvozov’s radio
telegram to be broadcasted. Dybenko
declared that in under no circumstances he would let the information coming to
the capital would get to the enemies of the revolution. Admiral Razvozov was
angry about the increasing self management of Tsentrobalt and was still
attempting to deter some of its telegrams.
Radio stations in the Krondstadt fortress and one of the
battle ship “Aurora”
were the first radio stations that began to connect to one another with
Helsingfors. Pavel Dybenko sends a short message to Belushev, chairman of the
ship’s committee of the Aurora. The message has been described as, ‘a precursor
of things to come.’ The message simply
stated that the Aurora has to conduct training shooting on
October 25th.
In Petrograd and as a
result of Dybenko’s communiqué, Lt. Ericksson wrote to the Commander of the
Baltic Fleet, Admiral Razvozov on October 23rd.
Lt. Ericksson’s message stated:
“URGENT, This afternoon the head of the ship
committee of Aurora has received the order from
Tsentrobalt,
“From now on, do not leave Petrograd without Tsentrobalts order”
The head of the ship committee has tried to insist to
Dybenko on the necessity of the battleship leave in order to test the
machines. The test is planned for
Wednesday and the ship will have to leave no latter than tomorrow for it to
make its commitment at Kronshtadt.
However, Pavel Dybenko insists the Aurora
remain in Petrograd on October 25th
–26th. The head of the ship
committee didn’t dare disobey Tsentrobalt’s order and informed me about the
situation. Admiral Vederevsky is
informed about the situation
By the noon the chairman of the Tsentrobalt Pavel Dybenko
received telegrams from the Smolny. To provide operative leadership for the
detachments of the sailors Tsentrobalt appointed three people: Dybenko,
Averichkin and Izmailov.
In Krondstadt the executive committee of the Soviet created
a general staff to lead the compound detachment that was to be sent to Petrograd on October 25. The executive committee
suggested to sail the linear ship “Dawn of Freedom” to the sea canal at the
dock 114 and to put an armed ship across the station of Ligovo.
I. Kolbin, a member of the executive committee was elected
the commissar of the ship. Among other
tasks “Dawn of Freedom” had to install a post of the service communications on
the shore and to establish the ship radio station is a controlling one for
providing communication with the Baltic fleet ships.
At 4 PM in Helsingforse the members of the Tsentrobalt
gathered at the yacht “Polar Star”.
Everybody knew almost by heart the radio texts about the current
situation in Petrograd. At the end of their
meeting the following resolution was made: “…to continue to maintain the
advanced position of Tsentrobalt.. to be ready to go or either win or die on
the first call of Tsentrobalt.”
At 7.30 PM a meeting of all the
democratic organizations opened ashore. At the tribune was a sailor from
Svearborg battle mine ship, Ivan Michailov, he held a radio telegram from the
Krondstadt Soviet in his hand. Silent
audience was intently listening to his every word. Reactionists launched their
attack… Indescribable indignation exploded long preserved silence.
The chairman of the Helsingfors Soviet, A. L. Sheiman,
finished his short speech saying: “Who is not with us is against us. Who is not
for the Soviets is against them”.
Chairman Pavel Dybenko ends the meeting with the following.
“To support the proletariat of Petrograd
with armed force.”
“The time has come to show how to die for the
revolution!
“For it is better to die for freedom and dignity than to
live without either.”
Very soon Pavel Dybenko got the telegram that actually
required confirming all the words with real actions. There were only few words in that telegram:
“Send out the code. Antonov”. This
indirect order meant; send out battle ships to Petrograd
and no less than five thousand sailors.
…Officers ship “Krechet” moored along the granite wall in
the South Harbor.
Dybenko, determined and stoic, knocks politely on the door
of the office of the fleet commander. Captain I. I.
Rengarten, Admiral Razvozov’s Chief Intelligence Officer recalled, “While I was
still talking, Dybenko came into the room.
He is a tall robust man, with a luxuriant growth of hair, a black beard,
and a pleasant looking face; he was dressed in a gray jacket and held in his hand
a soft, broad brimmed hat; he bore himself modestly and politely, but with
perfect self confidence. The admiral looked up at him glumly. “I hope you are
here not to invite me to some meeting?” ”All the meetings are finished for
now”, - Dybenko sounded concentrated, he realized all the importance of the
moment.
Now Tsentrobalt, which back in September declared that it
won’t recognize the authority of the provisional Government but would obey
operative orders of the commander of the fleet, could dictate him the will of
the sailor masses. “The ship crews decided to help the Soviets. We send battle
mine ships out to Petrograd. They will support
the armed forces from Krondstadt. We have received an open radio from the
executive committee of Krondstadt. Though you must know about it yourself”.
Dybenko put the neatly folded telegram on the desk in front
of Admiral Razvozov:
-
“This is the calling of Tsentrobalt that has been
accepted now. Tomorrow it will be in the papers. Soon you will receive the
official orders of Tsentrobalt….”
Then came Tsentrobalt commissars and brought three documents
each signed by Dybenko and Loginov, the time on all the documents was 21.40.
Tsentrobalt was ordering the battle mine ships “Zabiaka”, “Strashnuy”, “Metkiy”
to sail out to Petrograd. In order to assist the Tsentrobalt commissar
Stepan Zhuravlev another member of Tsentrobalt, Andreev was appointed. The third document that was sealed with red
crossing anchors the admiral studied with special attention. It said: “Tsentrobalt
decreed – commissars of Tsentrobalt should be present during deciphering of all
the telegrams and making of the orders.” This was almost over. The speed with
which the events were unfolding and decisive tone assumed by Tsentrobalt would
paralyze the admiral’s general staff. From now on all his orders, all his
communication lines and radio channels will be under the sailors’ control. All
the ship radio stations would work only for the Soviets.
The admiral was distracted from his ponderings by the head
of the operative department of the general staff: “Please allow to report, Sir.
We have received new telegrams from the shore.”
Admiral nodded automatically. “The first telegram from the
general staff of the naval Minister about the order of the pre-election
agitation at the fleet…”
“This is really funny”, - suddenly interrupted the admiral,
- “Does it say by any chance what kind of events Lenin and Dybenko plan for
October 25? They are after all the Baltic fleet delegated to the Constitutional
Assembly. I would be very much
interested to know that…The fleet must fight and not burst into fountains of
words. They have forgotten about this in the Admiralty. We have too many shore
sailors now.”
One of the Tsentrobalt orders:
“From the acting fleet, Krondstadt, executive
committee. Regards to the red
Krondstadt. Battle
mine ships “Samson” and “Zabiyaka” are sent to help you out. They will go
directly to Petrograd. Please provide them
with food.’
Tsentrobalt, October 25, 1917
After Dybenko left, Admiral Razvozov looked absent-mindedly
at the letter in front of him: Razvozov read on, “The Baltic fleet won’t shake in fear in the
face of any reaction forces or revolution enemies…”
All night long Dybenko was dispatching echelons with armed
sailors to Petrograd. On the darkened streets of the city one
company after the other were marching towards the railway station. It seemed as if opened bellies of the
railroad cars were swallowing people and new detachments were replacing them
again and again. From Helsingfors to Petrograd
extended a long chain of the commanding blocks. The commanders at the stations
were strictly following the hourly schedule, with unfailing preciseness the
echelons were arriving at the city of the revolution
From the memories of the chairman of the Tsentrobalt, Pavel
Dybenko:
The loading of the train was going without any delays;
echelons were following each other in every hour and a half, one after the
other. The orchestras were playing “Marseliesa” (the song of the French
revolution). You could hear a loud and
cheerful “Hooray!” from the echelons.
At 8 o’clock I saw off the last echelon and hurried to the
main office of the Tsentrobalt. At that moment straight line of the battle mine
ships were passing solemnly by the Tsentrobalt. There were red banners on their
masts proclaiming: “All the power to the Soviets!” The crews at the leaving battle ships were
lined up on their decks. The musical orchestras and thunderous “Hoorays!’ were
following those leaving for the fight in Petrograd.
The Bruns park brightly lit by the morning sun was filling up with people.
Thousands of joyous eyes of the workers were seeing off the
battle ships. You can read the question written over the faces of the sailors
who were staying in Krondstadt: “What about us? Are we not going take part in
the Petrograd revolution?”
They called us from the “Republic” and “Petropavlovsk”
asking: “Are we not sailing off to Petrograd
too? We are ready. We are just waiting
for your order”.
We will send you off to in case it will be necessary. Just
be on alert for now
Later on, on the deck of the “Polar Star” (the offices of
the Tsentrobalt) there stood Admiral Razvozov watched events as they
unfolded.
Dybenko asked him; “So, what about now? Do you believe now?”
Admiral Razvozov replied, “Yes. This is a miracle. Impossible
things are happening. With such a passion and persistence you are bound to
succeed.”
The ship radio
stations repeated the following telegram multiple times up till the midnight.
On “Krechet” radio operator Makarov gave this telegram to Pavel Dybenko
together with the report of the “Samson” commissar, Grigoriy Borisov:
“To Tsentrobalt. Everything is calm in Petrograd.
The power is in the hands of the revolutionary committee. You have to
immediately get in touch with the front committee of the Northern Army in order
to preserve unity of forces and stability.”
Meanwhile Lenin shows his impatience. He called upon Shienman, Chairman of the
Helsingfors Soviet of Soldiers, Sailors, and Workers Deputies.
Lenin: Are
you authorized to speak in the name of the regional committee of the army and
the fleet?
Sheinman: Yes,
I am.
Lenin: Can
you send at once to Petrograd a great number
of torpedo vessels and other armed vessels?
Sheinman: We’ll
get Dybenko, chairman of Tsentrobalt on the wire directly, since this is a
naval question. What’s the news in Petrograd?
Lenin: The
news is that Kerensky’s forces are approaching and have taken Gatchina, and as
some of the Petrograd troops are exhausted we
are in urgent need of strong reinforcements.
Sheinman: What
else is new?
Lenin: Instead
of your question “What else is news?” I expected you to say you were ready to
come and fight.
Sheinman: It
seems useless to me to repeat that. We
have made our decision, and consequently everything will be done.
Sheinman’s interaction with Lenin illustrates how
independent the fleet was, how Dybenko’s authority was thought to be absolute,
and finally how determined the fleet took its decisions.
Izmailov, Deputy Chairman of Tsentrobalt affirmed this in
conversation with Lenin. Lenin attempted
to direct the Navy by calling for “battleships to enter the Ships Canal!” Izmailov had to explain to Lenin that
battleships are large vessels and cannot safely anchor in the Canal, he
continues educating Lenin on the abilities of the ships then with assurance
recommends; “in short let the sailors and their command handle this
Still not satisfied, Lenin has Antonov-Ovseenko inform Dybenko
of his displeasure concerning the number of troops dispatched to Petrograd and of his demands for more. Dybenko replied,
“Of course we will come to Petrograd if we knew Petrograd couldn’t cope with 500k workers, 150k troops in
its garrisons, and Kronshtadt in the bargain?
Pavel agrees to send 5k more sailors and the crews of 4 mine sweepers.
The sailors and ships began arriving toward Petrograd yet it wouldn’t be until evening before the
first armed clash with the government happened.
The Battle at the Winter Palace
was to take place. The fighting
proceeded with the rival forces alternately in possession of the huge piles of
wood stored in the plaza, a part of the city’s winter fuel supply. The glare of an arc light illuminated the
positions of the forces in the plaza while the rest of the city was in almost
total darkness; this condition increased the visibility of the flashes from the
guns of the cruiser Aurora whose
blasts gave warning of the speedy bursting of shells. The palace, which already had been stripped
of most of its historic art objects, had been completely denuded of its
tapestries and paintings. This was while
the Provisional Government was still in control of the palace. The art treasures were taken to a place of
its selection. A correspondent who was
with a party of reserve Workmen’s and Soldiers’ forces and a short distance
from the great archway leading into the plaza, did not see any of the shells
take effect upon the palace. Lights were
still shining from the windows in the palace well into the night. Occasional crashes as if of falling walls,
indicated that perhaps other structures had been hit. The populace for the most part remained
indoors. A few of the curious peered
around the corners while thousands of Maximalist troops and the sailors of
Tsentrobalt gathered around the fuel piles at advantageous spots awaiting their
turn in battle.
Across the Neva from the Winter
Palace the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul did not take aggressive steps against the
Provisional Government until fire was opened on the fortress from the Winter Palace. A Lieutenant at the fortress recalled, at
about 8 in the evening, bullets from the Palace began raining down on parts of
the Fortress. No harm was reported to
the structure nor was anyone wounded. In
response, the Fortress, gave “one short volley from a machine gun in the
direction of the palace.” As the firing
continued sailors form the cruisers placed guns on the shore and fire three
rounds of shrapnel into the air above the palace. After many hours of exchanging fire, the
commander of the Preobrajensky Regiment telephoned the fortress and called for
a cease-fire as the palace wished to surrender and desired to know the
conditions.
The reply was short and to the point.
“To
surrender peacefully and to give up all arms.”
After several tense minutes the commander must have changed
his mind for at 10 in the evening the palace fired upon a battery of sailors on
shore. The sailors in answer sent
several shots against the wall of the palace.
The sailors’ litany of fire made sure the palace was kept on the
defensive curtailing any offensive moves.
It was true the women’s battalion was among the first defenders of the
palace, but it is also true they surrendered before the battle began.
Woman's Battalion |
The Commander of the Preobrajensky Regiment finally gives up
and the transference of power to the Soviets had begun. The battle that had raged on through most of
the night had ended and when it was over an eerie silence fell over the
battle-scarred plaza. Sailors and
soldiers alike entered curiously into the palace. The palace was empty save a few items the
Provisional Government thought not worthy of taking earlier.
One thing the Provisional Government couldn’t have taken was
the incredible feeling of years past as the sailors and soldiers stepped into
the palace. Even as they all knew that
all the cruel and horrendous acts committed against the good people of Russia
originated from here, a certain deity prevailed in the air. The Kings were still there, and so were the Queens, perhaps not in body but certainly in historical
spirit.
The taking of the Winter
Palace was the first in a series of
successes to come for those in agreement with what many saw as a beginning of a
new day in Russia.
Meanwhile, over at Smolny, the elite intellectuals were
meeting.
“We must take practical measure immediately to effect the
promises given by the Bolshevik Party,” Lenin said, “ The question of peace is
a burning one today, therefore the first act of the new Government which is to
be formed is to offer to all nations a democratic peace, based on no
annexations and no indemnity
“We plan to offer an immediate armistice of three months,
during which elected representatives from all nations, and not the diplomats,
are to settle the question of peace,” said Nikolai Lenin, in a speech before
the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Congress
“We offer these terms,” added Lenin, “but we are willing to
consider any proposals for peace, no matter from which side. We offer a just peace, but will not accept
unjust terms. One side cannot end this
war alone”
On a raised platform in the commencement room of the Smolny
Institute, the headquarters of the revolutionary government Leon Trotsky was
seated, carefully groomed, smiling triumphant in workman’s garb. Nikolai Lenin, quiet, reserved, and studious,
was beside him. Near them was Alexsandra
Kollontai, young, attractive, and earnest.
The others of the present controlling government of Petrograd
were grouped about them. The room was
crowded with delegates, soldiers, predominating. There were also a number of sailors seated
among the peasant delegates. The first
battles were in Tsarskoe Selo and the Pulkovo Heights. The Cossack regiments were to attack the
sailors and Red Guard and run them out of Pulkovo heights. Hundreds under Pavel’s command died defending
the revolution in Tsarskoe Selo only a few miles from the capital. Among those who gave their lives was Vera
Slutskaya, killed by a shell as she tried to get medical supplies across enemy
lines. Alexsandra recalled this day
vividly as she remembered arriving at Smolny.
She was surprised to find Lenin, Trotsky, and others all huddled in a
room with newspapers covering the windows.
The leaders outlined the aims and decisions of the Military
Revolutionary Committee as follows:
“The
abolition of capital punishment, the immediate release of all soldiers arrested
by the Kerensky government for political offenses, all members of the Kerensky
government are to be arrested and all the revolutionary committees ordered to
arrest Kerensky himself and to punish those aiding him to escape.”
The Proclamation of the Congress
The Workmen’s and Soldiers Congress in a proclamation issued
today announcing that it has taken over the government, urges the soldiers to
prevent any attempt by Kerensky or others to oppose its authority.
It goes on:
“We appeal to the soldiers in the trenches to be vigilant
and firm. The Congress expects the
revolutionary army will protect the revolution against all imperialistic
attempts until the new government has obtained a democratic peace, which it
will propose, directly to all the peoples”
“The new government will take adequate measures to assure to
the army all necessaries and by energetic requisitions from the upper classes
it will also ameliorate the economic situation of soldiers’ families.”
The proclamation further declares that the Congress will
propose an armistice,
“To come
into force at once on all fronts.”
“The power of the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates,” it
continues, “will assure the free return of all private, state, and
ecclesiastical lands to the peasants committees.”
“It will guarantee to all nationalities inhabiting Russia the
right of her sons to organize their own future.”
Another section of the proclamation reads:
“The parties of General Korniloff, Kerensky, Kalendine, and
others are endeavoring to move troops upon Petrograd,
but several detachments of troops who were with Kerensky have already passed
over to the side of the people in the revolt.”
“Soldiers, oppose the active resistance of Kerensky—that
partisan of Korniloff. You, railway men,
stop the forces that Kerensky is sending to Petrograd.”
At Smolny it was further announced that among the Commissars
chosen by the Revolutionary Committee was, Mme. Kollontai, who has been placed
temporarily in charge of the Department of Public Welfare.
The Military Revolutionary Committee has decided to bring
General Korniloff, leader of the recent revolt, and his supporters to Petrograd
and imprison them in the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul.
They will be brought to trial before a military revolutionary
tribunal. Rumors, however, have reached
Smolny that Korniloff has made his escape from custody.
As for the Ministers it is confirmed that they had been
arrested at the Winter
Palace after its
surrender by the Military Revolutionary Committee and have been remanded to the
Fortress for imprisonment. The details
of the confinement of the ministers are uncertain. It is said the ministers
were taken to the fortress where they were placed in solitary confinement, but
were courteously treated. A total of
fourteen Ministers were confined in the Troubetsky bastion. They were all allowed to write and receive
letters and have access to any kind of literature. Additionally, the Ministers were permitted to
wear their own clothing and have at their disposal everything belonging to
them, except of course weapons. They are
being fed well yet are not allowed to see anyone until the inquiry has taken
place.
Having silenced the Provisional Governments the victors make
announcements throughout the evening.
Radio broadcasting of events and decrees flooded the airwaves.
From the radio station broadcasts of the ‘New Holland’
“To all the soviets: companies’, detachments’, and ships’
The All Russian Soviet session has the following resolute:
Capital punishment restored at the front by Kerensky is to
be cancelled. Complete freedom of
agitation at the front is restored. All
the soldiers and revolutionary officers held under arrest for ‘political
crimes’ are to be released immediately.
The Revolutionary Committee has arrested former ministers Verdrevsky and
others. Kerensky fled. We order all the military organizations to
undertake everything in their power to capture Kerensky and to deliver him back
to Petrograd.
Any kind of help offered to Kerensky would be punished as a serious
state crime.
The ‘New Holland’
broadcast more decrees by the Military Revolutionary Committee;
“To all the railroad workers’:
The workers and peasants revolution has won in Petrograd. The
railroad minister is arrested among other ministers. The All-Russian session of the Worker’s and
Soldiers’ deputies expresses its confidence that the railroad workers will do
everything in their power to preserve order at the railroads. The railroad transportations shouldn’t be
stopped even for a minute. Special
attention should be paid to letting through the food railroad cars to cities and
the front. The revolutionary power of
the Soviets assumes responsibilities to improve the living standard of the
railroad workers. Representatives of the
railroad workers will be involved in the new railroad Ministry.
To the fleet far and wide:
“Tsentrobalt
declares to the Fleet:”
On October25th the power passed over into the hands of the
Soviets. The Provisional government is
arrested. Kerensky fled. You have to take up all the possible measures
to detain him and send him back to the revolutionary committee of Petrograd. All the
fleet detachments have to stay alert protecting their battle positions.
All the orders of Tsentrobalt are to be fulfilled exactly
and without delays. Stay calm and remember
that Tsentrobalt safeguards the Revolution.
Chairman
Pavel Dybenko
Secretary
F. Averchkin
Pavel Dybenko arrives at Petrograd
with a detachment of sailors. Izmailov
becomes acting chairman of Tsentrobalt and sends a cruiser and a destroyer to
the immediate area of the capital.
At Smolny, such figures as Alexsandra Kollontai, who was
beautiful and striking excited interest and attention. The sailor, Dybenko looked heroic…reported
George Sokolsky, while John Reed experienced, “There passed Podvoisky, the thin
bearded civilian, Antonov, unshaven, drunk with lack of sleep; Krylenko, the
squat, wide faced soldier, always smiling, with his violent gestures and
tumbling speech; and Dybenko, the giant-bearded sailor with the placid face. These were the men of the hour and of other
hours yet to come.”
All the while Kerensky was issuing orders and proclamations
for support. Here in one of those
communiqués Kerensky speaks to the troops of the Petrograd
district.
“I declare
that I, the Premier of the Provisional Government and the commander in chief of
all the armed forces of the Russian
Republic, arrived today
at the head of troops from the front, devoted to the motherland.
I order all units of the Petrograd Military District, which,
from lack of understanding, have adhered to a band of traitors to the
motherland and the Revolution, to return to the fulfillment of their duty
without delaying one hour. This order is
to be read in all companies, commands, and squadrons.”
Premier of the Provisional Government and Commander in
Chief,
Alexander Kerensky Gatchina, October 27th,1917
Major General Krasnov made an appeal to the Cossacks the
very same day.
Major General Krasnov |
"By the
will of the Commander in Chief I am appointed commander of the troops, which
are concentrated before Petrograd.
Citizen soldiers, valiant Cossacks of the Don, the Kuban,
the Trans-Baikal, the Ussure, the Aur and the Yenisei, all you have remained
true to your soldiers’ oath, you who have sworn to keep the Cossack vow strong
and inviolate, -to you I turn with an appeal to go and save Petrograd from
anarchy, violence, and hunger, and Russia from the indelible mark of shame
which has been thrown on it by a dark handful of ignorant men, led by the will
and the money of Emperor Wilhelm.
The Provisional Government, to which you pledged allegiance
in the great days of March, is not overthrown, but has been violently driven
from its headquarters and holds its sessions with the great army from the
front. Citizen soldiers and valiant
Cossacks of the Petrograd Garrison!
Immediately send your delegates to me, so that I may know who is a traitor to freedom and the
motherland and who is not, and so as not to shed accidentally innocent
blood.
Dybenko would not allow for Krasnov’s and Kerensky’s pleas
to go unanswered.
The following is from Tsentrobalt’s calling during the
current struggle.
“To
everybody and all.
Tsentrobalt is calling to all who treasures achievements of
freedom and revolution.
Comrades!
The sun of truth and people’s victory has been shining
brightly since the movement passed power into the hands of the people. But dark clouds are forming and are hanging
now over the horizon…
Great steps were made before the Second Soviet Session.
The long awaited dream of the people, land was now passing
into the hands of the people.
The long desired wish for peace is now being offered to all
parties of war and that a truce has been declare at all the fronts.
The cursed decree of capital punishment has been lifted.
These are the achievements given to us by the revolution of
October 25th.
…In spite of provocative rumors that Tsentrobalt swept to
the side of the betrayers Kornilov and Kerensky, Tsentrobalt declares that the
Baltic fleet has sent its representative to the Second Session of Soviets
entrusting them with voting for Soviet power, which it defended and will
continue to defend. The whole Baltic
Fleet absolutely trusts the newly organized Soviet authorities and obeys it
without any questions; we see this power as the only legitimate power.
Long live the People’s Government of Workers, Peasants,
Soldiers, and Sailors!
Tsentrobalt
Albert Rhys Williams
described Dybenko; as the commissar of marine forces—now twenty eight years
old, a dashing figure with curls showing under his astrakhan hat tipped
rakishly on the back of his head, a closely clipped fan-shaped goatee, and
curved mustache…
John Reed described Pavel Dybenko as “a giant, bearded
sailor with a placid face.”
In 1917, Dybenko was twenty-eight years old, tall and broad
shouldered with dark hair and eyes. He
was a handsome man, genial, modest, dedicated, and well liked. Dybenko was capable of fiery explosions when
addressing the fleet, but otherwise he impressed people with the even temper
that seemed to run contrary with his size.
Dybenko sends out another proclamation over the radio,
“Tsentrobalt
warns you against information spread by Kerensky, Kornilov and Kalendin. All the rumors about Germany taking Petrograd and Moscow are absolutely false. You can trust only the radio of the Military
Revolutionary Committee and Tsentrobalt.
We shall win. The criminal
operation of Kerensky will be defeated.
Lenin immediately sets out to control what he knows best,
the distribution of information. Amsterdam news reported, “Dispatches that were received
from Petrograd are subject to the censorship
of the Maximalists and probably portray only one side of the situation. Nikolai Lenin, who fled Petrograd after the
July failure, is again leading the Maximalists, at whose back are most of the Petrograd garrison and sailors from the Baltic fleet.”
The sailors in Kronshtadt, Helsingfors, and Revel
impatiently waited to be informed of the events as they unfolded. Tsentrobalt wanted to hear from Pavel.
Later in conversation with the Commissar of the Navy
Revolutionary Committee Marulin,
Tsentrobalt's Loginov asks, “Can you tell us where Dybenko is?”
To which Marulin replies, “He came to Tsarskoe Selo at about
one and then went back. Pavel is the
head of the unit that is going to fight Kerensky’s troops.”
Indeed, Dybenko had gone to Tsarskoe Selo to check out the
situation at the front. Earlier in the
day on his way out of Smolny, Dybenko ran across Antonov-Ovseenko. Together they decided to go and after finally
procuring a vehicle they walked down the steps toward the automobile. Dybenko recalled, “When we were getting into
the car, two civilians insisted that we take them along. Both looked like journalists, I found out
subsequently that one of them was John Reed who wrote the famous book, Ten Days That Shook the World. Antonov-Ovseenko allowed Reed and his
companion to travel with us.”
Reed’s companion was Albert Rhys Williams author of Journey into Revolution and many other
works on the Revolution. The journalists
recalled they won approval from Antonov-Ovseenko when they explained that it
was “most important for two American journalists cover the story and give to
the world the true picture of the workers heroic defense of the revolution.”
On the way Dybenko asked to stop for some food, as he hadn’t
eaten since leaving Helsingfors the previous morning. The driver stopped at the nearest food shop
along Suvorovsky Prospect. Retuning with
sausage and bread the driver then asked Dybenko for money to pay the
proprietor. He hadn’t a kopek, nor did
Antonov-Ovseenko; an additional occupant, Alex Grumberg, a Russian exile,
helped out the military commanders by providing the necessary money. Grumberg was working as an observer for both
the Bolsheviks and the Americans.
A couple of mishaps continued to plague the two commanders
on this particular journey. The vehicle
they were traveling in broke down on the outskirts of Petrograd. Pavel looked for an appropriate vehicle to
“procure’ under the authority of ‘urgent business on behalf of the
revolution.’ A short time later a
vehicle approached flying the Italian flag.
The occupants declared they were protected with diplomatic immunity and
as such were not obligated to relinquish their vehicle. Dybenko convinced the driver and occupants to
comply stating they would be welcome to the broken vehicle as soon as it was
fixed which he assured would not be long.
With the new vehicle procured, Dybenko and Antonov-Ovseenko,
with Reed and Williams in tow, drive on.
The vehicle makes its way through a constant stream of armed workers and
soldiers. Dybenko from time to time
would encourage the throng by declaring:
“The
sailors were on the way”
Through the mud the workers and soldiers plodded their way
to the front, in ever increasing numbers as the two commanders became nearer to
the front. Antonov-Ovseenko would ask
men periodically, “Who is commanding you?”
None knew, but it didn’t stop the men who if nervous did not show
it. These men inadequately supplied with
munitions and food did not allow for circumstances to diminish their enthusiasm
for the moment. They all came, in ragtag
groups all with confidence in hopes of helping to create a better way for Russia. Their moral was high; all were prepared to
face the fierce Cossacks of Kerensky. At
that moment, Antonov-Ovseenko met up with a young worker who said he and the
others all stood in readiness for battle yet did not have enough
ammunition. “We have guns you see’, said
the young man, “with no ammunition for them.”
Antonov-Ovseenko, proudly declares the soviet force held
plenty of ammunition at both Smolny and in the Fortress. He added factories were producing much more
as they spoke, “Here, I will give you an
order for ammunition.” He reaches for
his pockets and finds he does not have paper to ascribe such an order, he asks
the journalists for help. Reed and
Williams began fumbling through their notebooks looking for a clean piece of
paper. Again it would be Grumberg, who
helped, this time he provided the commander with some paper and a pencil to
write his order.
Thousands of Russian men came to the front in anticipation
of confrontation with the fierce Cossacks.
Pavel had felt the enthusiasm was indeed amazing but unless this mass of
men received much needed support by way of an organized military outfit their
optimism would definitely be in vain. To
take on and defeat the defenders of the Provisional Government would not be an
easy task. Pavel decided it was time to
return to Smolny and formulate a plan of action to take against Kerensky and
his supporters.
The situation is very nervous. Kerensky is advancing toward Petrograd but nobody knows exactly what is going on or
how much manpower the enemy actually has.
Dybenko knew he had the better part of 70,000 sailors available to take
on the powerful adversaries. He was also
keenly aware that in order for a new way to begin the old had to not only be
confronted but also defeated. Antonov-Ovseenko
and Dybenko return to Smolny and report the units at Pulkovo heights are disorganized
but willing. These units are in need of
munitions, rations, and above all organized leadership. The two commanders also find out that
Kerensky’s troops have taken Tsarskoe Selo, they are supported by Cossacks with
artillery and an armored train.
Inside Smolny a chaotic filled atmosphere prevailed. Red Guards and sailors filled the courtyard,
sentries stood at the doors and a stream of couriers and Commissars pushed in
and out. The sounds of excited voices
are heard throughout. At the center
table, Dybenko, Antonov-Ovseenko, and Podvoisky were bending over he map
marking out position for the troops with red and blue pencils. Dybenko recalled, “After I left the meeting
with Podvoisky, I met with Lenin in an office down the hall. With that never disappearing smile on his
face, Lenin asks, “Well, how are things at the front?” Dybenko responded by saying he is going to
the Naval Revolutionary Committee and immediately will move detachments of
sailors that are supposed to arrive from Helsingfors today to the front,
otherwise Kerensky might enter Petrograd.”
Dybenko leads his sailors into battle with Krasnov. Armored vehicles on both sides led the
assaults as Russian’s from two distinctly different worlds clashed in an
attempt to create a better Russia. The Cossacks had history and the very
survival of their established existence at risk. The sailors of Tsentrobalt were fighting with
the strength of slaves having found their independence. The battle raged on.
General Krasnov, a monarchist of the old school, had organized the defense for Kerensky. The Cossack regiments were to attack the
sailors and Red Guard and run them out of Pulkovo heights. Hundreds under Dybenko’s command died defending
the revolution in Tsarskoe Selo only a few miles form the capital. Among those who gave their lives was Vera
Slutskaya, killed by a shell as she tried to get medical supplies across the
enemy lines. Alexsandra Kollontai recalled
this day vividly as she remembered arriving at Smolny. She was surprised to find Lenin, Trotsky, and
others all huddled in a room with newspapers covering the windows.
General Krasnov’s account reveals that the sailors were an
important stiffening force. When the Cossacks
charged near Pulkovo, whole crowds of black figures ran off in disorder. But they were the Red Guards. The sailors steadfastly remained in their
places. This unsuccessful attack, noted
the general, was very disadvantageous to us from the point of view of
morale. It showed the steadfastness of
the sailors. And the sailors were
numerically ten times greater that us.
How was it possible to fight under such conditions? Krasnov added, “The sailors went over to the
offensive. With great skill they began
to mass on both flanks, I ordered a withdrawal.”
The sailors of Tsentrobalt had twice beaten off attacks of
Krasnov’s troops. Dybenko’s leadership
had freed Tsarskoe Selo and he continued to exert pressure on the opposing
forces. Subsequently, Colonel Muraviev
arrives at Smolny looking very tired and nervous. He reported that Dybenko and his troops had
just defeated and driven out of Tsarskoe Selo Kerensky and his Cossacks. Muraviev also mentioned the courageous
efforts by the men of the armored cars who helped in great part and whom had
been reported to have shot up the Cossacks badly.
In the meantime Krasnov had retreated to Gatchina and
attempts to reestablish his defense of Kerensky. At field headquarters, Dybenko was just
coming out, giving rapid orders right and left.
An automobile stood with racing engine at the curb. Alone, Pavel Dybenko climbed into the rear
seat, and was off, off to Gatchina to conquer Kerensky.
The Revel fleet radio station broadcast a new Tsentrobalt
telegram as Kerensky and Krasnov were attempting to motivate the Cossacks.
“Comrades! We, the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet
declare to everybody that we safe guard the achievements of the revolution and
rights of the oppressed class and that any attack on the people’s recently
achieved power would be defeated by all the might of the Baltic Fleet.”
Toward nightfall Pavel arrived at the outskirts of Gatchina.
John Reed wrote,
“What Pavel
Dybenko told the Cossacks nobody knows, but the fact is General Krasnov and his
staff and several thousand Cossacks surrendered, and advised Kerensky to do the
same.”
…Dybenko and his companion sailor Tushin took off on foot
well into the late hours and after midnight find the approach to Gatchina Palace.
This trip at the late hour was dangerous yet important at the same
time. The road to the palace was in good
shape as Dybenko and Tushin walked along with a white cloth tied to a
stick. The two had come to offer a
truce. The Cossacks send an envoy out to
meet Dybenko and to conduct negotiations without the consent of their
commanders. An officer and two Cossacks
invite Dybenko to speak before the Cossacks and to explain to them what Soviet
power was about. Dybenko and the sailor
Tushin agree to meet with them. The Cossacks
take them to the palace in Gatchina in their vehicle. The officer in charge asks Dybenko to give up
his weapons but Dybenko refuses.
In an upstairs room at the Palace, Kerensky is in discussion
with his long time associate Kozmin.
Suddenly, a Cossack guard interrupted the two, Kerensky recalled, “It
was in the morning that a soldier came into the palace and brought us the news
of Pavel Dybenko’s arrival.” Kerensky
knew now his repeatedly talk about the need for energetic action was
useless. He must have come to that
frightening conclusion that there was no longer any possibility of taking
any. Kerensky, about to be crushed,
turned to his associate Kozmin and continued their conversation of happier
times gone by.
Gatchina Palace |
Downstairs, would it be possible Dybenko could persuade the
Cossacks to stop the war and to arrest Kerensky?
It would prove to be a difficult task. The enemy though almost defeated was quite
strong. It can also be possible that
they were just waiting for supporting forces, Savinkov’s reinforcements. While Dybenko was trying to persuade the
Cossacks that Kerensky’s attempts to hold on to power made no sense and would
only cause more victims among the Cossacks…the radio stations of Petrograd and Tsarskoe Selo were broadcasting again the
first decrees of Soviet power; about peace and about land…
The Cossack guards take Dybenko to the barrack where the
Cossacks are resting. He asks if
Kerensky is there and suggest guarding him in case he decides to flee. Dybenko speaks before the Cossacks for
several hours about the betrayal of the Provisional Government and shares with
them about the new people’s power represented by the Soviet of Workers,
Soldiers, and Sailors. He tries to
convince the Cossacks that they are the same working people as the workers or
sailors and that the new power will express their interests rather then the
interests of rich capitalists.
Dybenko continues to tell the Cossacks about the new decrees
of the Soviet government to stop the war and achieve the peace, to save the
country from total destruction and give all the land to peasant committees, to
establish control over industry, and ban capital punishment in the
military. By 8 o’clock in the morning
Pavel manages to convince the Cossacks to stop fighting and to arrest
Kerensky. The Cossacks agree on the
condition that they have to get approval of the Cossacks Committee. A meeting was organized amongst the leaders
of the Cossacks and Pavel.
According to the memoirs of General Woytinsky, the truce negotiations
went as follows:
“Ten
Cossack representative sat on one side of a long table facing the sailors. One of the latter was a big, strikingly
handsome man with broad shoulders, a tanned face, pitch-black beard with bright
arrogant eyes. This was the notorious
Pavel Dybenko the ringleader of the Baltic Fleet.”
The question of safe conduct regarding the Cossacks was
immediately agreed upon.
“The
Cossacks were to withdraw from the civil war, in return, the Soviets would
assure the free conduct to their home, with their officers, arms, and horses.”
Now the Cossacks were demanding the release of officers and
students of military schools from prison.
.
“These dogs are not Cossacks and are none of your business,”
Dybenko firmly stated.
“They are our business,” replied the Cossack chairman, “We
stood for the same thing.”
Dybenko counters with-“To hell with what you stood for. Think of your own hides!
“We did not ask you for a cease-fire,” explode the Cossack,
“You asked, if you wish a truce make it fair.”
Dybenko turned to his companion, “What do you think
Tushin? I would not mind turning those
blackguards over to them. Why should we
feed them?”
The small sailor nodded, then the Chairman read the clause
of the agreement:
“All
officers and students of military schools arrested after November 5th
in Petrograd will be set free.”
“Now about Lenin and Trotsky,” said the chairman, “They must
go!”
“None of your business!” shouted Dybenko
“Make it fair,” insisted the Cossacks, “You told us that
Kerensky must not be in the government until he cleared himself of having
conspired with Kornilov. We agreed. Well, weren’t Lenin and Trotsky charged with
being German spies? Until they clear
themselves, they must not be in government…
“Did you catch them spying?” Tushin asked angrily, “or are
you repeating the dirty slander of capitalist newspapers? Now we see what kind of birds you are.”
The Cossack Chairman responds by saying, “All we say is that
they must stand a public trial. If they
are not spies they have nothing to fear.”
Meanwhile, upstairs in the palace General Krasnov meets with
Kerensky. “General,’ Kerensky said, “You
have betrayed me. Your Cossacks declare
categorically that they will arrest me and deliver me to the sailors.”
“Yes,’ Krasnov replied, “there is talk of it, and I hear
that you no longer enjoy sympathy anywhere.”
Kerensky asked inquisitively, “You’re telling me the
officers say the same thing?”
To which Krasnov said, “Yes, most of all, it is the officers
who are discontented with you.”
Kerensky feeling dejected, asks the General, “What shall I
do?” thinking to himself that he ought to commit suicide!
General Krasnov explained, “If you are an honorable man, you
will go immediately to Petrograd with a white
flag, you will present yourself to the Military Revolutionary Committee, and
enter into negotiations as Chief of the Provisional Government.”
Kerensky in a moment of resolve says, “All right, I will do
that General.” “Good,” the General
replied, “I will give you a guard and ask that a sailor go with you.”
Kerensky said cautiously, “No, no, not a sailor. Do you
know whether it is true that Dybenko is here?”
Krasnov ambivalently responds, “I
do not know who this Dybenko is.”
Alexander Kerensky, Head of the
Provisional Government declares coldly,
“He is my enemy”
The General unimpressed
unequivocally says to Kerensky, “ There is nothing to do then, if you play for
high stakes you must accept the risks inherent when you take the chance.”
“You’re right,” Kerensky
declared, “Yes, I will leave tonight!”
Krasnov becoming irritated said,
“Why? That would be flight. Leave calmly and openly, so that everyone can
see that you are not running away.”
Defeated, Kerensky tells Krasnov,
“Very well. But you must give me a guard
on which I can count on.”
General Krasnov leaves Kerensky
and calls for the Cossack Russkov, of the Tenth Regiment of the Don, and
ordered him to pick out ten Cossacks to accompany the Supreme Commander.
Downstairs the discussion about
Lenin and Trotsky continued. Finally, Dybenko
exclaimed, “These damn Cossacks are stubborn as devils. We are just wasting time with them. What do you think, Tushin?” Tushin shrugs his shoulders, Dybenko
vocalized, “Let them have their way, I rather am impressed with their
fortitude.”
The chairman wrote:
“Lenin and Trotsky will withdraw
from the government and abstain from any public activity until they have
cleared themselves of the charge of having worked for the enemy.”
Finally, Semenov decided to part
the excited crowd of Cossacks listening to the course of the peace truce and
interfered. He addressed the Cossacks
asking them not to trust the Soviets
Semenov went on to tell them that if they give Kerensky to the
Bolsheviks the latter ones wouldn’t fulfill their promise as they had power on
their side.
At this point, Dybenko answered
back, “Was there not enough butchering for you?
You need more blood? “That’s
right, -said numerous voices of Cossacks, it is enough, we have fought already.” General Semenov recalled his impression was
that he was in the middle of a demonstration and Dybenko was winning it.
It was then Gen. Woytinsky
offered up an amendment to the question concerning Lenin and Trotsky.
“Lenin and Trotsky will abstain
from any public activity until the accusations against them of having worked
for the enemy and against democracy are investigated by the Constituent
Assembly.”
Pavel turned toward the General
like a furious bull.
“You are no Cossack, mister! What are you doing here?”
“I am the Commissar of the
Northern Front and of this task force,” Woytinsky replied.
The Cossack chairman backed up
Gen. Woytinsky.
“The Citizen Commissar is our man.”
“He may be your man, but we are
here to negotiate directly with Cossacks, without middlemen,” shouted Dybenko,
pounding the table with his fists.
“No amendments or no truce!”
The Cossack Chairman did not
accept the Generals amendment and prepared the document of truce as a whole
agreement that could be read aloud to the Cossack delegation. There were eleven points to this agreement
and if followed through might have prevented Civil War…
Dybenko/Cossacks
Accord
№ 1 Kerensky was to be handed over to the Military
Revolutionary Committee in order to be tried at the open people’s court.
№ 2 Complete
amnesty and release from prison all younkers and officers and other people who
took part in the struggle apart of those who have serious grounds to be accused
of state treason.
№ 3 Release
and grant special passes to all members of the Soviet Council of the Cossacks
Army.
№ 4 Cease
all plundering and violence against the civilians if any have occurred and to
prevent such from happening in the future.
№ 5 Have
free and organized passage for all the Cossack families with the right to take
all the required possessions with them.
№ 6 Establish
security for the Gatchina
Palace and its
surrounding after the Cossacks have departed.
№ 7 Full
guarantees of peaceful and uninterrupted functioning of the Gatchina Schools of
both Warrant Officer and Aviation.
№ 8 Grant
sufficient time for the Cossacks detachment to load their belongings.
№ 9 Immediately
on completion of the negotiations, reestablish railway communication in order
to organize supply of all the necessary provisions.
№
10 Open all outposts and establish free
communication with the Capital
№
11 Lenin and Trotsky will withdraw from
the government and abstain from any public activity until they have cleared
themselves of the charge of having worked for the enemy.
In view of the relative forces of the
two parties, the truce agreement was amazingly favorable to the Cossacks. The agreement is an honorable one based upon
the belief that a coalition government was to be formed.
Kerensky recalled, “Time passed. We waited.
Downstairs they were bargaining.
Suddenly, at three o’clock in the afternoon, the same soldier who had
brought us, in the morning, the news of Dybenko’s arrival came running in. His face was as pale as death. The bargain had been concluded,’ he
explained, “The Cossacks had bought their freedom and the right to return to
their homes with their arms for the price of only one human head.” To carry out the bargain, i.e. my arrest and
surrender to the Soviets, the enemies of yesterday, in quite friendly manner,
had chosen a mixed commission. The
sailors and Cossacks were ready to rush into my room at any moment.”
Semenov also came to Kerensky’s room
and told him that the “truce negotiations are lost and that a car is waiting
for him and has to flee.” Unexpectedly,
two men, a soldier and a sailor, whom both Semenov and Kerensky had not known
before made their way into the room.
These two men greeted Kerensky and told him, “There is no time to
lose. Put this on.” Kerensky remembers, “This consists of a
sailor’s cloak, a sailors hat and automobile goggles.
Semenov recalled helping Kerensky
into the sailors disguise. The cloak was
too small and persisted in falling back on his neck. The deceptive attire appears ludicrous and
dangerous. But there is nothing to be
done. Kerensky only had a few
minutes. Semenov was worried, “What if
Kerensky wouldn’t get by the sentry or worse yet what if he were to be
recognized?” The sentry had a sleepy
face and at the gate an automobile awaited to scurry Kerensky away from
accountability
Half an hour after Krasnov gave the
order to assemble the escort for Kerensky, several of the Cossack came to tell
him that Kerensky was not in his quarters; that Kerensky had run away. General Krasnov not surprised wrote in his
diary, ‘I gave the alarm and ordered that he be searched for, supposing that he
could not have left Gatchina, but he could not be found…
General Woytinsky rushed into the
room where Dybenko and the Cossack chairman were finalizing the truce. He had a telegram about Kerensky’s escape in
his hand. The General actually had hoped
to prove to the Cossacks by this that Kerensky didn’t flee but went out to meet
with new armed forces. A little to late,
everything was in vain. The Cossacks
were tired of endless promises and tired of fighting. The trust the Cossacks had for Kerensky and
his supporters was over. General
Woytinsky was arrested.
The radio was used to inform
everybody about Kerensky’s escape and to call for his capturing:
To
all Army, corps, divisional and regimental Committees, to all Soviets of the
Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants Deputies, to all to all all.
Conforming to the agreement between
the Cossacks, younkers, soldiers, and workers, it has been decided to arraign
Alexander Feodorvich Kerensky before a tribunal of the people. We demand that Kerensky be arrested, and that
he be ordered, in the name of the organizations hereinafter mentioned, to come
immediately to Petrograd and present himself
to the tribunal.
Signed,
The Cossacks of the First Division of
Ussuri Calvary, the Committee of Younkers of the Petrograd
detachment of Franc-Tireurs; the delegate of the Fifth Army.
People’s Commissar Dybenko
As for General Krasnov he too would be
arrested. During the negotiations of the
treaty he sat patiently waiting in a room at the palace unwearyingly writing
his recollections of the events as they were happening. The Chairman of the Cossack Committee took
the signed document to Krasnov. In the
archives at General Headquarters there is a short and eloquent reply to the
question of Kerensky’s arrest. “On
November fourteenth, I telegrammed Gen.Dukhonin and informed him that I ordered
the arrest of the Commander in Chief, he managed to escape.” Furthermore, Gen. Krasnov orders the sentries
to retire and the troops to assemble in the garden. Amid Petrograd
soldiers, sailors, and workers, the Cossacks assemble in the courtyard. On the balcony of the palace, in front of the
troops, stood Gen. Krasnov, Gen. Woytinsky, and Pavel Dybenko.
Gen. Krasnov read the whole agreement
aloud and stated that the agreement was premised on the understanding that a
coalition socialist government was to be formed, based on the agreement being
worked out by the Railway Workers’ Union and
finally with sadness in his heart, General Krasnov declared:
“Now
my job is to take you home. We have done
all we could. Not ours is the shame for
what is going to happen in Russia.”
After having finally met the enemy of
Kerensky, Gen. Krasnov remembered Dybenko in his memoirs of the events as they
unfolded:
“Our
truce was concluded and signed by Pavel Dybenko, the representative of the
sailors. A tall and handsome man with
black curly hair, black whiskers and thin young beard, with big languorous
eyes, white face, red cheeks, contagiously happy, with sparkling white teeth,
with a joke ready on his lips, physically strong with a noble posture. In a couple of hours he charmed not just the
Cossacks, but a lot of the officers as well.
Dybenko respectfully arrests both
Gen. Woytinsky and Gen. Krasnov and prepared to personally escort them both
back to Smolny.
From the report of the Chief
Commander Antonov and the head of the General Staff Bonch-Bruyevitch
To Moscow, Soviet of the Workers and Soldier
Deputies of Lefortovo
Final Defeat of Kerensky
Kerensky’s troops are
defeated. The whole general staff of
Kerensky is under arrest including Generals Krasnov and Woytinsky. Kerensky fled disguised as a sailor. Cossacks came over to the side of the
revolutionary troops and are searching for Kerensky in order to hand him over
to the Military Revolutionary Committee.
The Kerensky Mutiny is considered liquidated. The revolution has won.
Honor of arresting Kerensky belongs to the Minister of the Navy Pavel Dybenko.
Honor of arresting Kerensky belongs to the Minister of the Navy Pavel Dybenko.
On the evening of November 16th
John Reed watched two thousand Red Guards swing down the Zagorodny Prospect
behind a military band playing the Marseillaise-and how appropriate he wrote
that it sounded. Red flags and banner’s
declaring victory were seen throughout the crowds.
Over at Smolny, the celebration
was tempered, as an account taken form Wildman’s The End of the Russian Imperial Army, demonstrates Lenin as furious
about Dybenko’s actions and wanted to have him court-martialed. Who was Pavel
to agree to even the temporary removal of both he and Trotsky?
Nikolai Podvoisky agreed with
Lenin and in his memoirs he confirmed he too wanted Pavel court-martialed:
“Pavel
Dybenko, on his own initiative sent representatives to Krasnov to demand his
surrender. Krasnov got Dybenko to agree
to his departure to the Don together with the Cossacks who would retain their
arms. An agreement consisting of eight
points was drawn up between them. In
this way Dybenko had tied the hands of the government. We were opposed to the Cossacks being allowed
to return to the Don with their arms, as we had no reason to believe that they
would fulfill their promise not to fight against Soviet Power. I insisted on Dybenko being tried by
court-martial and the agreement with Krasnov renounced.
Podvoisky went on the say that Lenin
was in full agreement. The question was
placed before the Petrograd Soviet. The
Soviet of People’s Commissars declined to ratify the treaty, negotiated and
signed by Dybenko. Lenin inspires the
delegates to declare Dybenko had exceeded his authority. To put forth Dybenko had
the authority to arrange a cease-fire but not a peace agreement with the
Cossacks. The Peoples Commissars honored
only the clauses relating to the Third Corps and other Cossack regiment. The Military Revolutionary issued them a pass
to the Don Region. General Krasnov and
the Cossacks gave their word of honor that they would not fight against Soviet
Power.
What was the reason Dybenko was not
court-martialed…who did the refusal to indict Pavel Dybenko at this time benefit?
The sailors’ longstanding battle with
the Tsar and its search for a dignified government had supposedly come to
fruition.
The sailors of Tsentrobalt, all of
them, collectively took down the existing government and made way for an
opportunity to better the existing social structure. The sailors of Tsentrobalt were a force to be
reckoned with in the early hours of the revolution.
Dybenko’s influence and stature brought
him to the forefront of the revolution in the hearts and minds of all familiar
with the happenings. The writers of the
time…youthful hero of the Aurora,…heavily
determined the outcome of the revolution,…plays a decisive role.
The handsome Pavel Dybenko with the
beautiful Alexsandra Kollontai on his side fashioned a romantic addition to the
already successful accomplishment of the sailors. The people of Russia loved and admired the hero
of the revolution, Pavel Dybenko.
Alexsandra saw Pavel as ‘passionate, steadfast, and totally decisive,’
as ‘the soul of Tsentrobalt, firm and determined.’
Lenin and Trotsky were not pleased at
all. After all they were the one’s, at
least in their eyes, that made the revolution possible. There were already banners displayed of Dybenko
and Kollontai greeting the revolution while standing at the helm of the Aurora with several
sailors standing behind them. The two
were revered as the hero and heroine of the revolution. As their affair blossomed throughout the
following months their celebrity further touched the Russian public as the two
were to become known as the “famous lovers of the revolution.”
Dybenko takes up the position of
Peoples Commissar of the Navy. He is the
youngest of the three members of the Committee of Army and Navy Affairs
appointed by the Second Congress of Soviets.
Dybenko is twenty-eight, Antonov-Ovseenko is 37, and Krylenko is 32. Many in the staff of the old government
refuse to serve under the new Soviet power.
So these positions have to be filled with faithful activists of the
revolution. Dybenko carries out this huge
responsibility of appointing the right people to the right positions.
Dybenko went on to turn his attention
to the morale of his troops. The problem
was particularly serious with the cellars at the Winter Palace. A number of soldiers had raided the wine
cellars of the Winter
Palace and had
distributed the contents among their fellow soldiers, the Preobrazhensky
Regiment, which had been put in charge of guarding them, got drunk and became
quite useless. The Pavlovsky Regiment,
our sure revolutionary shield, went the same way. Teams of soldiers were sent, picked from
various regiments: they too got drunk, large numbers of whom had been roving
around the streets after the revolution in a ferociously drunken state. The crowd had to be dispersed by armored
cars, whose crews were soon reeling too.
By nightfall it had become a wild orgy.
“Let’s drink up the Romanov’s leftovers,’ the said gaily in the
crowd. Order was restored in the end by
the sailors fresh from Helsingfors, Pavel Dybenko seized the wine barrels and
hacked them open, so that for several days the gutters of Petrograd
ran red with the wine of theTsar.
Dybenko also announced that any soldier found drunk would be shot—thus
earning him the undying gratitude of the government for the swift measures he
took to ensure a sober October.
Louise Bryant, author and girlfriend
of John Reed noted, “They were the true moralists, the sailors, for they
cleaned first their own house before they went about sweeping the dirt of
others. In Kronshtadt the sailors posted
notices forbidding all drunkenness, and thieves were to be punished…
Back at Smolny, Trotsky and
Stalin had just walked into the conference room near Lenin’s office. In the corner behind an unpainted wooden
partition rang the sound of Pavel’s thick basso voice. Pavel was speaking by telephone with Finland and the
tone of the conversation had a rather tender nature. Stalin then asked Trotsky if the rumors regarding
the two were true…was Pavel ‘seeing’ Alexsandra? Trotsky recalled that Stalin had a curious
reaction, jealous yet almost voyeuristic, after he had answered the
question. The twenty-eight year old son leader
of Tsentorbalt, the black bearded sailor, a jolly and self-confident giant had
indeed become intimate with Alexsandra Kollontai, a woman of aristocratic
antecedents who knew half dozen languages.
The relationship with Alexsandra
was now able to flourish. Alexsandra was
proud of Pavel and his accomplishment.
Alexandra’s friends were less than enthused about her infatuation with
Pavel. Discussion of marriage came up
but Zoia and Misha, resenting the new rival for her affection urged Alexsandra
to remain single, “Will you really put down our flag of freedom for Pavel’s
sake?” Zoia asked, “You, who all your life have been fighting against the
slavery that married life brings and that always comes into conflict with our
work and achievements.” Misha added,
“You must remain Kollontai and nothing else.”
Although for Alexsandra she was
smitten, she continues to admire the young sailor, without knowing about their
future together. Alexsandra has been
strong-willed since she was a child; she always got what she wanted. When asked by a journalist how she could
involve herself with Pavel Dybenko, a man seventeen years her junior, she
replied as if she was defending herself.
Alexsandra answered right away.
Maybe she was always ready for that question, she was a very smart
women, her answer was praise worthy and became well known. That’s how the “We are young as long as we
are loved” aphorism appeared.
Alexsandra was indeed
impressive. Wherever she went her beauty
caused the best of men to take notice.
The women admired her beauty but were not as stirred as most men.
An example of her ability to
electrify came in the memoirs of French Officer Lt. Jacques Sadoul when he
described his meetings with Alexsandra Kollontai in November of 1917.
“The
People’s Commissar of Public Welfare had an elegant tight dress of black velvet
on, it was sitting fine on the well-proportioned long and flexible, free in its
movements body. The right shape of the
face, thin features, hair is soft and fluffy.
Her eyes were blue, deep and calm.
It is amazing to think about the beauty of a Minister that’s why I
remembered this feeling that I never felt before at any other Ministry
meeting.”
Meanwhile, Nikolai Lenin, who
long before this day bombarded the public with decree after decrees that spoke
to the Bolshevik platform of federalism, democracy unfolded to its natural end,
liberties, persuasion, and freedoms. And
now, after ascending to power he would begin to pervert the worlds
understanding of Bolshevism. Lenin
embarked on a path which he desired centralism, dictatorship, nationalization,
and in order to achieve these goals he would need to utilize intimidation—in
other words, terror. Finally the quest
for freedom was only an illusion, there were to be no freedoms…only a new form
of ‘black reaction.’
Lenin was convinced in order to
achieve his desired results, he would have to do away with Dybenko and the
revolutionary sailors of the Baltic Fleet.
The sailors convictions were in tune with the understandings of Bolshevism
as it appeared to be. The sailors would
have never been in support of helping create a government so horrific and
unyielding as Lenin’s new platform of Bolshevism represented. So different from the idealism and
achievements brought about by October. It was inevitable; Lenin’s selfish and disturbing
views of society split the Bolshevik party.
Lenin hated any kind of dissent and did not allow for the split to
cripple his goals and would ultimately lead to the creation of the Communist
Party in March of 1918.
Lenin was a student first and foremost. He had a mind that could dissect the most
complicated of issues. Lenin always
studied his obstacles he would also utilize any opening to discredit, destroy,
and or debunk his opposition. In this
case, the opposition was the very thing that put him in office. Lenin called for a Navy Conference under the
guise of solidarity and support for the People’s government.
As with Prince Lvov and Kerensky
before him, Lenin also knew the fleet could destroy him. Lenin wanted to check out his opposition
close and first hand. He wanted to find
the sailors’ Achilles heal.
The word was sent out through
official dispatches that say a Congress of the Sailors is to be held in Petrograd to consider questions relating to the Navy.
“To
all Central Committees of the Navy”
To bring about a timely meeting of
the Congress of the Navy, we suggest all measure be taken such as will enable
the delegates to be present in Petrograd on
November 28th. One solution
of the essential questions is to be to be introduced in legal manner into the
life of the Navy of the Great Russian Republic.
Naval and Military Revolutionary
Committee of the All Russian Navy
Claims initiated by Lenin and his
government declared the situation in the Navy to be very complicated. Russian history tells us that many are making
demands of the sailors form the Baltic Fleet, whether it is to help establish
Soviet power or to fight remaining enemies.
As Minister of the Navy, Pavel receives telegrams daily requesting
“revolutionary sailors” to be sent out and help at the frontlines or different
towns. Lenin wanted history to reflect
that the Navy in general and the Baltic fleet in particular may fail to remain
the major supporting force of the revolution.
This was why, Lenin declared, the 1st
All-Russian Naval Congress is so important.
Lenin had begun his ploy to centralize power and do away with the freely
elected Tsentrobalt.
“The Congress’, Lenin said, “has to
pass some serious resolutions dealing with raising the level of discipline,
appointing commissars to every ship, dismissing the elective system of
commanding staff and other restrictive measure.”
Lenin himself contradicted these
understandings of an unorganized and in disarray Navy when he spoke to and
acknowledged at, the All-Russian Naval Congress.
“The
fact the Navy was operating independently and had created a new order”
Furthermore, when speaking to the
creation of government, Lenin stated:
“But
the art of practical government, which has been monopolized by the bourgeoisie,
must be mastered. In this respect the
Navy has shown itself to be well to the fore, offering a brilliant example of
the creative capacity latent in the working masses.”
Lenin finishes his speech at the
Congress and charges the sailors to support the revolution and Soviet
Power.
During the last session of the Naval
Congress, the delegates were honoring men who had performed heroically during
October by awarding these brave men new ranks.
Lastly, the question of recognizing the service of Pavel Dybenko in the
fight for the attainment of Soviet Power was put forth. The delegates decide to honor Dybenko by
awarding him the highest Naval military rank available, an Admiral.
“Comrades,” said Dybenko, “I want to
thank you for all the attention and allow me to make a suggestion, I began this
fight in the rank of a conscript sailor and I have already been promoted to the
rank of free citizen of the Soviet
Republic, which for me is
the highest rank ever. Allow me to
continue my service in this rank.”
The Congress exploded with applauds
and loud Hooray’s. The sailors’ were in
awe of Pavel’s act of humility. The
ovation lasted for a very long time.
“Pavel
Dybenko was exceptionally charming,’ a former soldier of the 3rd
Kronshtadt regiment recalled, “Even now I can still picture him standing in
front of me. A well built tall sailor,
about twenty-eight years old, with lively black eyes and a small beard. I can still see his contagious smile.”
Lenin was witness to this outpouring
of respect and adoration the sailors gave to Dybenko. The adoration Dybenko held caused Lenin
apprehension. Dybenko’s personal
charisma and ability to negotiate fairly…democratically challenged the one rule
mindset of Lenin.
In the meantime, Kerensky surfaces
and sends a message from his hiding place in Petrograd
to the newspaper Dielo Noroda. The paper published Kerensky’s statement,
which said in part:
“Come
to your senses…I am telling you that! I,
Kerensky, that Kerensky whom your leaders have glorified as a
“counter-revolutionist” and “Kornilovist,” but whom the Kornilovists wanted to
surrender into the hands of the deserter Dybenko, and those who are with him…”
Next in the Great October Series
The aftermath of Great October
through July 1918
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Pavel Dybenko's "Decree on the Democritization of the Navy of the Russian Republic" January 1918
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