The Untoward Legacy of Pavel Yefimovitch Dybenko

                 The Untoward Legacy of Pavel Yefimovitch Dybenko     
         

        Viewing Pavel Dybenko in the darkest of terms i.e. executioner political adventurist does a disservice to the many Russians who believed in what they wanted...made choices to make possible a better future...with dignity and a proud spirit inherent within all Russians. Universal held opinions on Great October which maintains the movement was nothing more than a “Bolshevik” coup does much harm to the populist ideals desiring freedoms and representation.  Incontrovertibly, having lived under the Romanov rule for hundreds of years; Russians looked forward to and were on the precipice of a dynamic shift in social policy.   This sentiment evidenced by the quantity of films and photographic images of the sheer number of individuals taking to the streets in the early decades of the twentieth century.  Witnessing the support demonstrated time and again in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities, towns, and villages brings one to reasonably conclude Russia having had enough of life under the heavy handed rule of the Romanov.

Concomitantly the actions of the sailors and in particular the members of the Baltic Fleet were coming to fruition.  Numerous years previous to Great October the sailors had been involved in a real life and death struggle with the authorities who supported the autocracy.   Many a sailor whose bodies are littered throughout the Black Sea and Baltic Sea were willing to die for the initiative which held clear a belief eloquently put by Dybenko as he spoke to his sailors

                         The time has come to show how to die for the revolution! 

                         For it is better to die for freedom and dignity than to live without either

An investigation of Pavel Dybenko reveals the story of a complex Russian man who has been defined, disparaged, and reviled by multiple leaders of opposing political viewpoints.  Kerensky benefits from having Dybenko removed from his authority in Tsentrobalt.   Lenin benefits from Dybenko being unceremoniously relieved from his base of influence.  Even after Dybenko was removed from power; the clergy alleges any mayhem committed by sailors had been directed by Dybenko.  

Contemporary Historians are in support of the demonizing viewpoints on Dybenko. Abiding authors endorse the vilification, historians such as Savchenkov, suggest atrocities committed in Ukraine during the Civil War have been attributed to Dybenko.  Suvorov tells his readers in subsequent years one sees Dybenko reinventing himself as a stupid careerist who favored the bottle. 
As a result, history has been unforgiving when dealing with Dybenko.  He is one of what historians’ terms as losers. A wise professor once put forth the concept, "But that is why historians need to exist --to examine 'losers' as well as 'winners'.  Otherwise, we will never understand the complexities of history".  
 
What would Pavel Dybenko say to the Russian public?  How would he respond to current conclusions of certain historical politicians; who seek to gain widespread Public support by vilifying everything related to Soviet system and by proxy those connected within its structures?
Are there people of the Soviet system who need to be vilified?  Absolutely!
Yet, the narrative following the question, “How does Dybenko, a solid young Russian who according to Kollontai and others, ‘best represented freedoms ideas’ during the tumultuous year 1917, end up with such a apathetic legacy?”, remains unspoken. 

Unfortunate for the man who throughout the days of 1917 was described to have had a great sense of being an eloquent speaker and of having absolute respect and authority with the sailors.  N. F. Izmailov believed it was by Dybenko's leadership that Tsentrobalt skillfully brought together many of the revolutionary ideals.  When the sailors all came together from the many different ships for a meeting, all indefatigable, energetic and loud...it required a lot of skill to keep this crowd under control and to channel their energy the right way.  According to Lt. Col. B.R. Bek, "It must not be forgotten that the victory of the Revolutions in February, March, and in October 1917, was due chiefly to the activity, firmness, and self-sacrifice of the members of the Baltic Fleet”.    One may also consider, “How does the “soul of the Baltic Fleet”, the “hero of the revolution”, author of the Charter of Tsentrobalt, author of the Democritization of the Fleet among many other historic documents become ignorant and illiterate within a few months? 

Indubitably, it’s a long story…

In the spring of 1917, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet agreed to create an organization, a body of elected individuals to oversee and mange the fleet’s relationship with the governing bodies.   Pavel Dybenko would ascend to the leadership of this Committee named Tsentrobalt.   Although the sailors were considered radical and disorganized by Russia’s political leaders…there were Admirals who were quite pleased and willing to find common ground with the sailors.  Commander in Chief Admiral Maksimov chooses to cooperate with Tsentrobalt, and a rather remarkable degree of harmonization was achieved between the sailors’ organization and the commandment staff.

As a result of cooperation with Admiral Maksimov, a Helsingfors dispatch stated that Tsentrobalt has decided to send a wire-less message to the allied fleets, saying that the Baltic fleet and the army defending its base is in complete readiness to fight to the last in defense of free Russia.   Newspapers printed the following communique from the offices of Tsentrobalt.

 “The Russian Baltic Fleet has now recognized the authority of the new Provisional Government, according to dispatches received today, and is under the control of the new Government.  After the first success of the revolution there were fears that the Baltic fleet would not bow to the authority of the new Government”

Even with giving the new government a supporting endorsement the political aspirations of the sailors were still concentrated in improving the military, social, and economic standing of not only the sailors but of all in Russia.  Led by Dybenko, the sailors remained faithful to the principles of representation of the people, the Soviets.  The working class of Russia looked upon the sailors as their most faithful brothers.  The sailors’ positions were not as radical as contemporary historians would have one believe. Other historians such as Dr. Evan Mawdsley relate Dybenko’s political views as being most likely leaning toward the center. 

Dybenko recalled this time and wrote,

“It is common belief that the Provisional government lost its authority over the Baltic Fleet only at the end of September 1917 but that is wrong.  The authority of the Provisional government over the Baltic Fleet was lost in fact back in April 1917.  The fleet was living its own separate life, went its own way notwithstanding government policy and even though there were some hesitations they do not contradict the fact the actual power over the Baltic Fleet was lost by the government already in April.”

Corroboration of the fleet’s independent political vision can be found in a 1915 Okhrana report. This report focused on the political activity of the Petrograd Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and concluded that the political circles of the fleet arose independently and outside of the influence of the politico’s in Petrograd.

Alexander Kerensky and the Provisional Government are not all together pleased with the draft of Tsentrobalt and did not agree with Admiral Maksimov’s tacit approval.  Kerensky moves to replace Admiral Maksimov with an appointment of a new Commander, Admiral Verderevsky.  Dybenko, together with delegates of Tsentrobalt issue a formal protest against appointment of Verderevsky in place of Admiral Maksimov.  Kerensky and Verderevsky refuse to sign the sailors Charter. The delegates maintain they will still apply it until the All-Russian Navy Congress

Seeing the independence Tsentrobalt demonstrated, Lenin seeks to influence the political will of the sailors.  Lenin dispatches several of his political cohorts to Helsingfors…to make connections with Dybenko and move him toward a more favorable position…the “Bolshevik” view. 

Antonov Ovseenko was the first Petrograd Committee politico to gain some foresight into the sailors’ leader.  Oveseenko establishes connections with Tsentrobalt when he arrives in Helsingfors the main base of the Baltic fleet.  Immediately he was made aware of the man they called Dybenko.  Antonov Ovseenko recalled  “...he stood out with his completed solidity, low voice, confidence in his walk, calm reserved look -black eyes and curly beard – a beautiful fellow, and very businesslike. He is the chairman of Tsentrobalt and “an old sailor from the flagship”.

Another long-standing political ally of the Bolshevik elite also came to Helsingfors. Her name was Alexsandra Kollontai and from 1915 to 1917 (when she joined the Bolshevik Party) she was one of Lenin’s few faithful advocates, and he wrote to her frequently.  Perhaps Kollontai can tame the man who presides over the armed force destined to have a hand in seeing to it who holds the levers of government.  Kollontai would become a driving force in helping the Petrograd Committee influence Dybenko into acquiring confidence in Lenin and her associates.  

However, political parties notwithstanding it would take until September before Dybenko and the sailors move to back the Bolsheviks.  In the summer of 1917, definitions of freedoms and power were being fought over not only by the political elite but also by men like Dybenko.  For Russia, the path to freedom and societal strengthening would not be determined by a workers revolution as Marx, Lenin, and others hoped as strikes and demonstrations had always been easily suppressed but through the unwavering determination of Dybenko and the armed first of the sailors of the Baltic Fleet.  

A combination of events unfolds as Dybenko and Tsentrobalt not only see the government dismissing Chief in Command Admiral Maximoff, a great communicator, with a more ardent and stringent Admiral Vederevsky.  At the same time, the powers in government found resolving the nation’s predicament complicated.  They would not end the war nor address the masses concern regarding land and liberty.  Former Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev described the ministers as inept unable to deal with current crisis’s and accordingly the leaders of the time inferred if Russia was not to be led by the Tsar, then the Tsar’s current policies would still remain in effect.  This action or inaction…forces Dybenko and Tsentrobalt to once again prod the government into an accountable social democracy.  Consequently, in July of 1917, Dybenko and Tsentrobalt take to the governing body a resolution calling for Kerensky’s resignation and the taking of reins for government by the Soviet leaders.  This political body, for the record, was not at this time, in July of 1917, dominated by the Bolsheviks.   Siding with Kerensky; the Soviet body refuses to consider Tsentrobalts resolution culminating with detention and or arrests of all sailors involved including Dybenko. 

For Lenin, witnessing the political inadequacy of the current leaders in power and the strength of the fleets’ political vision, he nails down his plan for dominance.  Always attentive for opportunity…Lenin’s political views move to the left, he would begin what G.P. Maximoff described as the greatest fraud perpetuated against the Russian people.  As a good politician Lenin spoke to the issues held close to the vest of the Russian citizen…idealism's closer to that of Dybenko and the sailors.  Quite the change as it was well known in the socialist and libertarian movements that prior to 1917, Lenin advocated for what many regarded as opportunistic vanguard-ism; the idea that the radical intelligentsia were going to exploit popular movements to seize state power and then to use the state power to persuade the population into the society that they chose.  

So Lenin lied…and the masses believed because they wanted to.   So did Dybenko and the sailors…with Lenin’s testimonies and Kollontai’s insistence that Lenin was indeed sincere as the leader for the party, the leader for Russia. 

Dybenko looked to the intellectuals to tend to the matters of social policy and the administering of government.  Believing they clearly heard the protestations and would make good on the promise of improving the conditions in the lives of the Russian people.  For the third time in seven months,Dybenko moves to support this latest group of intellectual elites.  Dybenko makes his decision formal at the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region held at Petrograd in early October.  Historian Alexander Rabinowitch views the Congress as a thundering, highly visible expression of ultra radical sentiment.  Others might say the Congress was a more polished and better-delivered presentation of “All Power to the Soviets”: the message the sailors and Dybenko struggled to communicate in July.  There were similarities, in both circumstances: Kerensky was called upon to resign, the request for the control of government transfer into the responsible hands of the All Russian Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasant Deputies, with assurance the fleet would safeguard the move.  But this time was different…the Bolsheviks held a majority in the Soviet.

“Dybenko addressed the Congress…”The Russian Fleet has always stood in the front lines of the Revolution.  The names of its sailors are written in the book of the history of the struggle against Tsarism.  In the earliest days of the Revolution the sailors marched in the front ranks, our ultimate aim being deliverance from all misery.  And this life and death struggle with our own oppressors gives us the right to appeal to you, proletarians of all countries, with a strong voice against the exploiters.  Break the chains, you who are oppressed!  Rise in revolt!  We have nothing to lose but our chains!  We believe in the victory of the Revolution, we are full of this belief.  We know that our comrades in the Revolution will fulfill their duty on the barricades to the bitter end.  We know that decisive moments are coming.  A gigantic struggle will set the world afire.  On the horizon the fires of the revolt of all oppressed peoples are already glowing and becoming stronger”

“We demand from the Soviet of Soldiers, Workmen and Peasant Deputies and the Tsentroflot the immediate removal from the ranks of the Provisional Government of the “Socialist,”--political adventurer Kerensky, as one who is scandalizing and ruining the Great Revolution, and with it the great revolutionary people, by his shameful political blackmail in behalf of the bourgeoisie”

Finally, Dybenko ended with a confident, “the crews of the fleet were ready to both repel the invader (the German) and determine the form of government in Petrograd”.

And so the populist movement known as Great October came to pass.  Kerensky cowering in a room at Gatchina Palace…wonders if Dybenko his arch enemy has arrived. 

Before his arrest…General Krasnov prepares to sign the truce agreement between the Cossacks and Dybenko.   The people rejoice…civil war had been avoided and the change of government appears to have happened virtually bloodless. 

Sorry to say for Mother Russia in this part of her history all’s not well that ends well. 

Lenin and Trotsky are furious that Dybenko had reached an accord with the Cossacks.

One that not only appeared favorable for the Cossacks but had disgracefully, according to the Bolshevik leaders, called for the removal or voluntary stepping down from government of Lenin and Trotsky.    Lenin was infuriated, demanding the annulment of the agreement as Dybenko was not entrusted with working out a peace accord rather his authority, as Lenin concluded, ended with an agreement to end hostilities. 

As soon as the revolution began it was over.  Dybenko was not, yet, court-martialed as the leaders wanted, although the writing is on the wall…the sailor’s minds were still fresh with the wonderment of revolution and Lenin feared immediate retribution. 

Lenin still played…advocating by decree everything imagined by a free man.  Some of which addressed land, liberty, and the removal of capital punishment once again,   

Lenin’s plan to institute his authoritarian designs was destined to take several months more.  By the first of March 1918 Lenin and his cronies had done away with most soviets including the most visible one, Tsentrobalt.   Lenin’s opportunistic vanguardism was clearly the winner as the so called Bolshevik coup, the party now named the “Communists” did indeed ride on the backs of the populist movement Great October.  Politicians involved in government were to be removed for any disagreement or dissent and Trotsky would become the new authority for the military. 

Lenin and Trotsky promoted the idea of total subordination.  Trotsky maintained, “What you need is a Labor Army which is submissive to the control of a single leader.   Modern progress and development requires the mass of the population to subordinate themselves to a single leader in a disciplined workforce

Subordination, discipline, submissive all words that hadn’t been heard of before except from the authorities Tsentrobalt, Dybenko, and the sailors had fought against. 
In contrast, the Democritization of the Fleet, authored by Dybenko between Great October and the Lenin’s Coup of March 1918 still held and spoke to precious rights thought to have been the harvest of the Revolution.  The contents of this draft not only speaks to freedoms of assembly and speech but also addresses the need for the governing body of the fleet, the Central Committee of the Sea, to maintain its independence and self-rule.                                                                                                                                  “All sailors of the Navy have the right to be members of any political, national, religious, economic, or professional organization, society or union.  They have the right, freely and openly, to express and profess by word or mouth, in writing or in print, their political, religious, and other views”

Dybenko failed at supporting the authoritative designs of Lenin and Trotsky…fermenting the disparaging nature historians and archival materials embrace him with. 

Having completely reviewed the events of Dybenko and the year 1917, many Russians can absolutely hold their head high…for within the mind of the world’s proletariat Russians will always be thought of individuals with an innate ideology of espousing freedom and opportunity for all. 

Did the struggle for reform seem futile?  It did pave the way for a government far worse than anyone imagined.  Was this government preferred by those millions who took to the streets in anticipation for the dawn of a new era?  Absolutely not!  Dybenko and many other solid freedom fighters including millions of Russians believed in the righteousness of mankind.  Russia put all her faith in the enlightened minorities…Prince Lvov’s Provisional Government, Kerensky’s Provisional Government, the Soviet leadership and lastly the few so called Bolshevik intellectuals all turned out to be either inept or nothing more than greedy individuals lustful for power. 

In the end analysis, the Russian people should take exceptional pride in the people they are.  Russians who believed in living free and with dignity manifested that desire into making Great October possible.  Those in support of Great October should not be burdened with a paralyzing sense of guilt, shouldn't  take on the baggage that today’s politicians are quick to place at their feet.  Contemporary politicians who attempt to correlate...who associate freedoms dreams with the authoritarianism employed by Lenin and afterward Stalin display a mindset that is shortsighted at best.       

George M. Levy

December  2013

Alexandra Kollontai and Pavel Dybenko

Kollontai and Dybenko

A tale of extraordinary Russian Romance

                                 He who has a good woman wears heaven in his hat

                                            And its always the woman's fault

The clouds were said to have parted on that spring day and a ray of sunshine cast down on the harbor of Helsingfors in 1917...it was then a spectacular relationship started between  Alexsandra Kollontai and Pavel Dybenko.  Authors of romantic novels found great material...newspaper writers invited their subscribers to bits and pieces of the love affair.  From metropolitan Moscow, Paris and Oslo one could read on the subject of the "romance of the revolution"                                                   

Kollontai was always adamant about achieving whatever results she set forth to accomplish, her writings impressive, her sophistication impeccable and her beauty breathtaking.  Kollontai relinquishes a comfortable and undemanding life as a daughter and wife of means.   Since the turn of the century she became active in the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party and she will become known to Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxembourg. 

Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxembourg

At this point in her life, Kollontai's interest lie in the vision of attaining certain rights she felt Russian women were not only deserving of but entitled to.  This revelation solidified after visiting a large textile factory in 1896.   Kollontai observed the horrid living and working conditions the female workers were exposed to.  The experience moved her to action; "Women, their fate, occupied me all my life; women's lot pushed me to socialism".  

So began Kollontai's many years of dedication to champion the cause for "liberi et sui iuris mulier"   She traveled throughout Europe and even to America speaking to this vision.  

In the early twentieth century while at various political meetings of the individuals who would soon shape the future of Russia, she would often declare that in Russia there exists half of the population who are women.  Unless women's interests are addressed in the plenary's work she would not, could not continue her work nor provide support. 

During the early twentieth century her political acumen among the male dominated debates was extraordinary.  Kollontai demonstrated her patience during this time by not fully committing to a particular party until 1915 or so.  It was then that Kollontai's intellectual relationship with Lenin really began to prosper.  Kollontai believed it would be through Lenin that she would be able to achieve her visions and goals for the betterment and emancipation of women.  Kollontai became one of Lenin's few faithful adherents and he wrote to her frequently. 

Many of the political elite knew of the relations of camaraderie and friendship existing between  Lenin and Kollontai. Kollontai was an avid supporter of Lenin's and followed him for many years. Russians who have been nourished by Tolstoy's literature can understand the idealistic and political meaning of the ties that bound Kollontai to Lenin. These "brain" connections are very delicate and generate very special feelings in all of us. 

Le Journal of Paris would publish articles portraying her as a member of Russia's new political leadership.  Referred to as the "Great Triumvirate" this group included Lenin and Trotsky.  Kollontai was so intellectually savvy...she could hold her own and often dominated many discussions.  

Although a committed champion for feminism...This drive, her passionate desire to influence and control outcomes was not limited to her political designs...her personal relationships had always been with men whom she would dominate.  Kollontai's worldly visions and understanding of women's relationship with men would soon be challenged exposing a weakness she would struggle with for years.

Enter Pavel Dybenko

How would this woman of means and political prowess come to fall in love with a peasant: a member of a class beneath her?  A meso-alliance declared by most historians, although Dybenko was a decedent of Polish Noblemen and the legendary Cossack.  A man who held charisma and charm in the palm of his hand.   More importantly Pavel Yefimovitch Dybenko was a respectful strong willed human being.  It is written and well documented Dybenko impressed both foe and friend alike.  Kollontai was not the first woman to desire Dybenko...and Dybenko was not prone to maintain a steady relationship.  Yet the two would enjoy a marriage that lasted for six years and a friendship that lasted many more.   

Dybenko's name first fell on the ears of Kollontai in the spring of 1917...during a meeting of various like minded politicos in St. Petersburg.  Inessa Armand shared with Kollontai she had learned that a sailor named Dybenko had thrown Kerensky overboard referring to an incident aboard the Viola between Kerensky and Tsentrobalt.  As the evening progressed Kollontai recalled the mood of her colleagues as being one of fear and apprehension regarding the activities of Dybenko and the fleet.  And for some reason the thought of this man named Dybenko excited her.     

By the spring of 1917, it was well known throughout Russia that the fleet would be instrumental in helping the powerful reconstitute its managing of Russian society.  As the army was revealed to be used as tool of the Tsar's government by carrying out punitive actions against demonstrating citizens.  It would stand to follow. 

One individual who viewed Dybenko and the sailors differently was Lenin.  Lenin recognizes the might of the Baltic Fleet would be necessary in order to develop his authority.  Lenin was about to find out how powerful the person of Dybenko truly was.

In an entry to her diary after the words "Honey, Honey" Kollontai wrote, "Strange that I never fear for his life. I have one concern to develop a disciplined party member". 

Meanwhile as Lenin and others play chess debating the outcome of Russia's future...real confrontations over representation and freedom with the Tsar's Government; real life and death consequences faced the men; the sailors of the Baltic Fleet.



During such times when Kollontai debates with her male confederates the necessity of recognizing women's issues, their plights... designs on rights and contributions to society;
The Tsar's fleet is freeing itself from ill treatment, condemnation and imprisonment.

Who was Pavel Yefimovitch Dybenko?
An informal Social Democrat?....an ideologue?...a product of Cossack and Russian peasantry.

Pavel Dybenko was granted everything nature could on a Russian man; tall, dark, handsome...with a powerful physique, and healthy...in addition Dybenko possessed the rare ability to not only command an audience but to get them to agree with him as well...

Having distributed anti-Tsar publications throughout his district and moving on to running information during the uprisings in the Starodub and Novozybkov Districts.  Dybenko was arrested and detained twice eventually being released on "no substantial evidence other than breaking curfew".  Although being arrested would include Dybenko being placed on the Okhrana's "list" of undesirables...untrustworthy individuals.  A price he paid for having immersed himself into the world of underground activism.

There are suggestions by many Historians who call into question Dybenko's "trustworthiness" and character.  Using as an example  Dybenko's leaving from his position with the NovoAlexandrov District Clerk's office.  However, it would be Dybenko's name on the Okrana's list that would disqualify him from work...not because he took some rubles...or displayed immoral character flaws.

Working among ex-Baltic Fleet sailors at the docks in Riga...Dybenko furthered his education of revolution while learning of the sailors' historical fight against the Tsar's rule.
The "Revolution from Below" will lay the foundation for hope and expectation of a new dawn.
Pavel Dybenko purposely fails to report to the conscription authorities and with that began his unceremonious induction into the Tsar's fleet.

                                                                                    Pavel Dybenko on right

Under the tutelage of the veteran sailors who had engaged in revolts and history of the development of the sailors into an independent revolutionary body. Pavel Dybenko crystallized the sailors vent up frustrations while ascending to the leadership of the Baltic Fleet, as Chairman of the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet, or Tsentrobalt in the spring of 1917.

It was under these circumstances that the world of Kollontai & Dybenko would collide...

Helsingfors, Finland...May of 1917, home to the Polar Star, headquarters of Dybenko and the offices of Tsentrobalt.

Lenin recognizes the Baltic Fleet would be needed to develop his authority.  Lenin directs ardent supporters of the Bolshevik doctrine...sending numerous politico's to Helsingfors to develop trust in Lenin; to propagandize on his behalf.  Men of association to Lenin and or the Petrograd Soviet.  Men such as Raskolnikov visits with Dybenko, as well as others such as Izmailov, Malkov, and Antonov Ovseenko.

Antonov Ovseenko and Raskolnikov memorialized in their own words of their perceptions when first meeting with Pavel Dybenko, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet, Tsentrobalt.

Antonov Ovseenko recalled, "Dybenko stood out with his completed solidarity, his low voice, confidence in his walk, calm reserved, with black eyes and curly beard--a beautiful fellow, and very businesslike.  He is the Chairman of Tsentrobalt, an old sailor from the flagship".

Lenin also sends in the seductress...Alexandra Kollontai.  The black raven of the Bolshevik hierarchy.

Alexsandra Kollontai enjoyed Lenin's confidence and from 1915 to 1917 (when she joined the Bolshevik Party) she was one of Lenin’s few faithful adherents, and he wrote to her frequently.  

Alexsandra was a beautiful woman and her presence created quite a stir.  “She has the witch’s eye, as the Italians say—large, dark and flashing eyes with effects almost Oriental, emitting something like a spark in moments of excitement.  The brows are perfectly penciled and the lashes hang over with effects almost Oriental.  Her chestnut colored hair is well groomed and abundant.  Her figure, corrected, we read, by a compression of the art of the corsetiere.  All her lines are elegant, like her gestures, and no Parisians ever fitted herself with skirts more clinging than the Kollontai’s.  The nose is just a trifle heavy, and the cheeks are pronounced rather than round.  The neck and shoulders are perfect.  The lady makes a physical impression of largeness rather than of solidarity.  In a word, there is very little of the Russian student type in the aspect of the lady.  She has the Frenchwoman’s instinct for dress”. 

Kollontai’s charge to persuade Dybenko into supporting Lenin began with her appearance in Helsingfors.  and the sailors of the Baltic Fleet against supporting a government’s position  appeared in front of the sailors, spoke on behalf of the Bolshevik position regarding the Freedom Loan and was escorted to the various ships by Dybenko and the leaders of Tsentrobalt  Kollontai also remembered her first meeting with Dybenko...recalling that he was a tall and handsome man who had deep facial features with eyes full of enthusiasm and energy that sparkled on his dark face. Nadyezhda Krupshkaya and Inessa Armand recollected the moment as when Alexsandra Kollontai first fell in love with Pavel Dybenko.

 

In the evening Dybenko was called to the Helsingfors Committee of thew RSDWP that was located in the in Mariyinsky Palace.  The meeting was over but the members of Committee were still there.  Pavel knew everybody except a nice-looking woman that was reading a document.  Boris Zhemchuzhyn introduced her, “This is Kollontai, Alexandra Mihailovna, a member of the Petrograd committee.”  Kollontai stopped reading, shook Dybenko’s hand and said, “You look exactly the way I thought you’d look, comrade Dybenko.  Sit down, we’ll continue our work”.  Kollontai was studying the draft of the resolution that expressed the attitude of Bolsheviks to the so-called “Loan of Freedom”.  The Bolsheviks were against this loan for several reasons:

                   1) this loan would help to continue the imperialistic war

                   2) it would be another burden on people’s shoulders

                   3) they did not trust the Provisional Government with 
                       the funding       

                   4) the money could be acquired from 90% increase in

                       taxing rich capitalists          

Kollontai spoke at the meeting of the Helsingfors Soviet trying to convince everybody that the loan was a mistake.  However, she was not successful.  The Bolsheviks’ resolution failed; Mensheviks’ resolution to approve of the loan received majority of the voices.  The sailors including Dybenko took Kollontai to the railway station.  Dybenko promised that the Tsentrobalt would call off the delegates who voted for that shameful resolution.  Kollontai said it was the right thing to do.  She said she would come back to speak before the sailors. 

Sent to seduce Dybenko into supporting Lenin, Kollontai would be successful...In an entry to her diary after the words "Honey, Honey" Kollontai wrote, "Strange that I never fear for his life. I have one concern to develop a disciplined party member". 

However, Alexandra would fall head over heals for Dybenko, believing she could both control Dybenko's loyalty to the party and enjoy an  interpersonal relationship...a gamble that would diminish her ability to have further influence on Lenin.    

The sailors' had conquered the Tsar's ruthless rule, had stood fast against any intrusions by the Provisional Government...yet Dybenko, smitten with the attention of Kollontai, worked on by Lenin's politicos and assured a place at the table of those who would lead Russia into the future...placed himself, the sailors, and Russia in precarious hands.  

A whirlwind of developments ensue, July Days, imprisonment in Kresty, disbandment of Tsentrobalt, Kornilov's attempts to control political chaos, Dybenko's release, reestablishment of Tsentrobalt and Dybenko as its "natural leader".   Northern Regional Congress declarations, the battle of Moon Sound, the vote for delegates to the Constituent Assembly by the Baltic Fleet, Great October, the Cossacks/Dybenko Accord, the declaration of Premier Kerensky stating Dybenko was his enemy, not Lenin, nor Trotsky, the arrest of Krasnov, the All Russian Naval Congress...

Throughout it all,  Dybenko believed in Kollontai's soft attention and her trust that the undertaking to establish freedom and dignity for those in Russia would be achieved.  Dybenko believing in Kollontai's trust in Lenin would prove to be a fateful decision. 

 

The relationship became fodder for print...from metropolitan Moscow, Paris and Oslo one could read on the subject of the "romance of the revolution" the "hero and heroine of the revolution",...there were posters made of Kollontai and Dybenko standing on the helm of the "Aurora" bringing to pass the dawn of the new era. 

Dybenko was no innocent bystander...getting caught up in the hullabaloo...By his own admission Dybenko would say he had only given in once in his life and that was when the beautiful aristocratic, Mme. Alexsandra Kollontai dragged him into her bed. 

“I was sacked,” he would laugh

Dybenko had great hope that the Russian experience would lead to an idealistic society.   Kollontai often encouraged the belief...the window of opportunity had come and there was nothing that couldn’t be achieved.  The year of 1917 seemed like a great period of freedom, liberation, and hope.

                    

Zeth Hoglund, Helen Green, and Carl Lindhagen...friends of Kollontai's throughout the Social Movement arrived...she was still Minister of Public Welfare and enjoying the status of being Dybenko's woman. 
For the first time in Russia...Dybenko and Kollontai's marriage would be licensed through a public registrar.  The marriage of Dybenko and Kollontai is well known to be the first entry in the Book of Civil Acts of the New Government.  

Shortly thereafter, an event occurred which saw Kollontai's attempt at finding shelter and care for the wounded military men coming home during World War 1 being thwarted...the famous Alexander Nevsky Monastery was chosen to shelter these patriotic souls and as before...under the rule of the Tsar...the good people of Russia and in this case those who would defend the motherland with their lives were...unfortunately turned away by the church!...The priests were more than reluctant...choosing a path of obstruction and denial of the monastery...they began arguing and prevented Kollontai from securing the monastery for the wounded men.  As things were getting out of hand...as the priests became more outspoken in their refusal...Kollontai called upon Dybenko to aid her in calming down the priests...to assure them the monastery was selected as it was empty and of the need for a hospice...for the care of the wounded veterans...Upon Dybenko's arrival...the priests continued with a confrontational view of the whole matter...Heated priests challenged one of Dybenko's sailors...a shot rang out and a priest lie wounded.  Some wrote upon the matter as...Kollontai being an Anti-Christ...others saw the church as unresponsive to the welfare of the countries wounded...either way a path was cleared...the church had long supported the Tsar and his oppressive and murderous tactics to remain in control.  Even in the smallest of villages throughout Russia the Church's priests played a dual role. Often working as an informant for the state police (Okhrana) all the while preaching gods word.  
For the first time in Russia history...and for many reasons...a proposal for the separation of church and state...similar to the doctrine in the United States was considered.

Much to Lenin's chagrin, Dybenko continued supporting the sailor's intentions of a freer society. 

The Subordination of the Sailors would be key to Lenin's taking full control of the government and Lenin's methods would be revealed in January 1918 after Dybenko authored the document entitled "the Democratization of the Fleet".   


Displeased, and in reaction to this document, Lenin puts forth a Draft Decision for the Council of Peoples Commissars on The Order of Subordination of the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.  Lenin writes: Considering the wording of the note to *51 (The Democritization of the Fleet) to be inexact or based on a misunderstanding, since the text, if taken literally, implies a refusal to recognize the supremacy of the Soviet state authority, the Council of Peoples Commissars asks the Navy's legislative organ to revise the wording of this note.

Excerpt of Dybenko's writing in the document that Lenin reacted so quickly to:

 “All sailors of the Navy have the right to be members of any political, national, religious, economic, or professional organization, society or union.  They have the right, freely and openly, to express and profess by word or mouth, in writing or in print, their political, religious, and other views

Freedom of association, of religion, of press, and speech...these are the views of Dybenko, the ideals the sailors had fought so hard to achieve.

Quite contrary to what Lenin and Trotsky wanted for the Russian public...
                      “What you need is a Labor Army which is submissive to the control of a single leader.   Modern progress and development requires the mass of the population to subordinate themselves to a single leader in a disciplined workforce.”

With the sailors not responding to the orders of Trotsky and due to the confrontation between Dybenko and Lenin...Kollontai would become exhausted.  

She favored maintaining Party Control and advocated change had to come form within...she somehow still believed there would be room for discussion...debate on various considerations including the Treaty, Labor, and Woman's Emancipation.  Kollontai sided against Lenin regarding the Treaty of Brest Litovsk...Dybenko and others such as Bukharin and Radek dissented and published a periodical entitled "The Communist" whereupon writings of the dissenting view could be made public.... 

Lenin wrote, “Since the conclusion of the Brest peace, some comrades who call themselves “Left Communists” have formed an “Opposition” in the Party, and in consequence of this their activity is slipping further and further towards a completely disloyal and impermissible violation of Party discipline. These are absolutely disloyal, uncomradely actions that violate Party discipline, and such behavior was and remains a step towards a split on the part of the above-mentioned comrades.

The climax of the showdown between Lenin and Dybenko ends in the disparaging and discrediting of Dybenko...during the events of what would become known as February 23rd, 1918.

                        In a "secret" document sent to Cheka's head Felix Dzerzhinsky, 

Lenin describes dark shadows having fallen on Dybenko. Detailing very grave accusations concerning the military operations at Narva and the fight against the German troops. Lenin asks Dzerzhinsky to immediately detain Dybenko and to inform him when he was in custody.  Lenin felt compelled to further instruct to keep the matter "top secret". 

Dybenko is arrested; At first for his opposition to the Treaty of Brest Litovsk then ostensibly for his actions surrounding Narva.  Dybenko's sailors demand his release...threaten to bombard the Kremlin...threaten to do away with Leinin and others...Kollontai is livid...Krylenko prepares the untruthful and false indictment against Dybenko entitled Protocol 82...

Kollontai wrote many letters to Dybenko in the prison:

 “ All my soul, my heart, my thoughts, everything is with you and for you, my darling, my beloved. I want you to know that I can live and will live only with you. Without you my life is dead and unbearable. You must be proud of yourself and confident. You can hold your head straight as no slander will ever mar your beautiful, pure and noble character”.

Attache to the French Military adviser,  Lt. Jacques Sadoul observed: 

       "I noticed the stress and anxieties of the last six months have taken a toll on the once vibrant and beautiful Alexsandra.  She was on her way to the Kremlin with food for her husband, and as Sadoul accompanied her, Kollontai shared that she was worried for Dybenko, having been arrested and for the fact he stood the possibility of being executed right away.   Dzerzhinsky threatened Kollontai, demands her to calm the sailors otherwise he may have to take drastic action...and by that he meant execution of Dybenko...

Kollontai did not escape the wrath of Lenin for her support of Dybenko.

Lenin told Alexsandra’s good friend Clara Zetkin that he;

           "wouldn't bet on the reliability of those women who confuse their personal romances with politics"

Louise Bryant, the American journalist who had become friendly with Kollontai, wrote that many Bolsheviks "looked with disapproving eyes upon Kollontai's infatuation for Dybenko”

Dybenko was not without supporters. The sailors had issued warnings...in the event Dybenko is not returned to the fleet...they will bombard the Kremlin and dispose of Lenin and Trotsky  

Kollontai wrote a letter to Dybenko on February 7 and 8 1922...

Its late at night around 6am where are you Pavluysha where are you my close friend?            And yet so far away right now…is it possible that your heart, your love for me doesn’t tell you how hard is it to listen hour after hour to the steps in the corridor

I know the night is almost gone and we have so few of them Pavluysha.                        Night isn’t only for kisses…the value isn’t in the kisses for us.                                               But in the communication of the heart that is so valuable for both of us 

The night is passing but, in my soul, there is only cold.                                                          I am lonely… horribly in pain.                                                                                        Where are you?  Why don’t you appreciate the hours that we could have together?

No, I know I trust in your love in its depth I know that I am closer and more precious to you than anyone else in the world and precisely for this reason because we mean so much to each other I write this letter. 

I don’t want the pain that lurches me now to happen again my kind Pavluysha.  I love our great and beautiful love too much not to want to keep it.  But I know the loves of love too well and that harm will always leave a trace.  That is why I am writing to you my beloved sweetness, my big boy.

 I am in pain Pavluysha I suffer so I can leave when you leave and I don’t know where you go … the most painful is not knowing what keeps you away from me…I think and I think …in the long night hours the imagination works feverishly I start guessing… making suppositions

What would you say Pavluysha if I acted in such a manner? After a day or two started mysteriously disappearing for a night? For half a night?  Just imagine this and maybe you will then understand my struggle.  

Where are you?                                                                                                                           There are two options, either at the club with friends or else there is another love interest, some flirt Pavluysha dear you should understand that I know too much about life and psychology to suffer. If I heard directly from you that yes now you have a flirt what will that be? Special? Unusual? would it take away your love or lessen it? of course not! understand Pavluysha that will not affect me.  But that you may be constructing a plot with strangers a secret agreement secret from me this is really painful

I note the fact that women are fascinated by you are you like it!  Let them be smitten by my beautiful Pavel I know you are mine… I note the fact your physical needs might push you to it...all of that is understandable and thus not to want to touch me is painful. Pavluysha, I fear this is why you avoid telling me directly.  Pavluysha, I know a few women and right now one interests me, amuses me I am going to her don’t wait for me I will be back in the morning.  

But you are in my heart I will smile and feel your trust in me and it will light the agreement, the love between us two and not some lady stranger. Yet that is not how it is now you live secretly like a thief and your remain silent as for me I don’t ask questions and I suffer by myself and you know it and our suffering grows. 

...

April 1923, ibid., 1:108. Dybenko was living with a young woman, the immediate cause of Kollontai's decision to end their marriage. In a letter to her friend Zoia Shadurskaia, Kollontai reported that Dybenko, unbeknownst to her, had used Kollontai's name to request women's clothing from Narkomprod (Commissariat of Supply) in order to provide for his young lover. Never had she been so angry in her life, Kollontai wrote. She had always u-ied to protect Dybenko but not now. Diary entry, 20 October 1923, ibid., 1:59-60. See letter to M. N. Kisliakova, 28 May 1924, in which Kollontai talks about her pain over the end of her marriage, in Kollontai, “Revoliutsiia- Velikaia Mialezhnilsa,” 189. On the same theme of suffering and seeking healing in work, see undated letter to Shadurskaia, quoted in Itkina, A. M., Revoliutsioner, Tribun, Diplomat (Moscow, 1970), 194                         

In Oslo, Chemist Vladimir N. Ipatieff recalled he had met with Kollantai, whom he had known long before the Revolution.  She was assistant to Surists, later succeeded him as ambassador to Norway, and still later became ambassador to Sweden.  Her former husband Dybenko, who was then commander of an army corps in the USSR, was also in Oslo.  He and she were still friends; evidently he still had great respect for her.  He impressed me as a rather pleasant, unassuming man.  I had no way of judging his military qualities, although he had gone through the Academy of the General Staff.  During the several days I spent in Oslo, I dined with them, went to the theater, and witnessed some winter sports.