Pavel Dybenko and the history of February 23rd

Pavel Dybenko and the history of February 23^rd

It is now two years removed from the 100 year anniversary of Great October.

Many years ago and after having met Pavel Dybenko a well renowned Soviet scientist named Vitaliĭ Iosifovich Gol’danskiĭ deemed Dybenko an extraordinary and legendary figure in Russian history.  According to Gol’danskii the spirit of Great October became more vivid to him while speaking with Dybenko and though many years had passed since their only encounter the impression Dybenko made remains clear as on that first day.  

Extraordinary?...Legendary?...two words hardly spoken when speaking about Pavel Dybenko.  Contemporary historians rely upon the written word of Soviet Archives.  Although one can find much in way of factual occurrences…there is just as much documentation motivated by propaganda and political influences.   

Case in point the events of February 23^rd.

The Soviet Archives tells of a tale that a disheveled, drunkard, and a coward of a man was responsible for a number of shameful events.  Henceforth, the disparaging and elimination of Dybenko’s influence on the navy and from government began.

We are all familiar with the resounding beat of the drum that occurs on every anniversary of February 23^rd.

            Pavel Dybenko unceremoniously retreats from a short battle at Narva.

He and his troops were said to be under the influence of spirits as they fled in an unorganized and chaotic way.  Others have told of Dybenko fleeing in his luxury railway car without giving the order to retreat thereby leaving his men in the lurch.   Most all infer Dybenko to have been such a coward, to have felt such fear…that he ran all the way to Samara!

Can the historian name the man who commanded the forces and retreated at Pskov?...how about the name of the man who commanded the forces and retreated from Revel?...Are contemporary historians aware that another figure in this Machiavellian plot, Lt. Gen. Parskii, previously commanded the forces and was responsible for the retreat from Riga in September of 1917?

Why does there seem to be more emphasis…more historical importance on this retreat than most any other in Russian history?  V. Lenin knows the truth…along with a small cadre of supporters. 

            Tsuryuopa, Stuchka, Krylenko, Polevin, Pravdin, Bronsky, Larin, Milyutin, Petrovsky, Bogolenov, Kozmin, Shlyapnikov, Krasikov, Nevsky, Kozlovsky, Trotsky, Raskolnikov, Stalin, and Slobodchkov

The entire convoluted fiction entitled Protocol 82 placing Dybenko at the center of such nonsense was meant to realize one result.  The censoring and removal from government of Pavel Efimovitch Dybenko.
Former Justice Minister Shteinberg declared the accusations and later trial had nothing to do with Narva…instead with  Dybenko’s political difference with the ruling order

Alexsandra KollontaiI proposed Dybenko had been betrayed, Narva was not the actual reason for his arrest, Lenin had simply used it as an excuse.

As for February 23^rd  

           

Meanwhile, at the Narva District and confronting the German advance Dybenko meets up with P.M. Bulkin who is chief of the group of sailors and soldiers retreating from Revel. Bulkin gives Dybenko a copy of his report sent to the Naval Board. Dybenko read, “All army units are demoralized, we are almost alone, those who stand to the end and defend the Soviet Republic. We asked for an additional 500 (or how many you have) sailors…..”, Bulkin went on to state the Germans kept bringing new reinforcements as his detachment continued to diminish.  The remains of Bulkin’s detachment were joined with the Northern Battalion of Dybenko’s.

The first fight the Northern Battalion was involved in took place near the small village of Ivveve. The fight lasted all day and all night on the 2nd of March. The air was cool and the snow thick making for a difficult engagement. The echelon of sailors met the Germans with two armored vehicles on platforms prepared to halt the advance.

The fighting of the battalion held in check many of advance attempts of the enemy. However, as with Bulkins units in Revel, no matter how many of the enemies were shot down they were always able to bring in more reinforcements. The battalion met the challenge of the enemy for what seemed like hours.
Then during one point of the fever pitched battle there was an explosion that rocked the earth. After the smoke cleared, the engineer driver and his assistant were killed and ten sailors seriously wounded. The sailors took up a defensive position. The fighting proved difficult without light artillery and reinforcements.

On the morning of March 3rd, the Germans began advancing with two columns, one along the railway and the other to the North along the Revel highway. It was early, the exhausted Northern Detachment were prepared. The Germans walked into a hornet’s nest. Fierce fighting took place near Vayvara-Korf. ...The fight continued with Dybenko, Pavlov, and Bulkin leading the detachment of sailors and soldiers from the Putilovsky plant through the thick snow attacking several times.

Brave Russians advanced several kilometers attacking the right flank of the Germans near Primorsky sector near Narva , The teutons column advancing from the north won over the Russian troops that were fighting there and in this way created the threat for Dybenko’s detachment of being turned from the rear. With no hope for reinforcements and over 500 dead and many more wounded, Dybenko was forced to retreat

As for reinforcements

According to Dybenko and his lieutenants the Supreme military council and specifically Bonch-Bruevitch provoked them on many occasions. The latter one kept promising to procure the sailors with everything they needed to fight but failed to do so. According to historical truthfulness the Red Army units didn’t just fail to help the sailors but moreover they were intentionally precluding them from organizing proper defense, while the sailors had no ammunition left the Red Army soldier had way too much and they spared them till it was too late to use them”.   Dybenko, Pavlov, Bulkin, and the remaining Northern Battallion retreat to Yamburg.

Lenin’s false accusations within Protocol 82 make the archives and historians have been relating Lenin’s falsehoods since. 

As for Dybenko’s frightened run “all the way to Samara”… more historical inaccuracy…Dybenko would not arrive in Samara until well after his appearance in Moscow.  It would not be until April of 1918 that Dybenko finds himself in Samara.

Even though universally held opinions regarding February 23rd remain, Protocol 82 runs contrary to the historical record.

What were those "political differences" with Lenin that Former Minister of Justice Shteinberg referred to? 
What did Kollontai mean when she stated Dybenko had been "betrayed"?

Double implications have become a familiar theme…one for the winners Lenin and Trotsky…the other for public consumption. The Myth that February 23rd was “birth of the Red Army Day” can be frankly tied to Trotsky’s taking control of the military in addition the Myth of February 23rd coming to be known as “Victory Day” can also be understood as the day Lenin and Trotsky wrested away the last vestige of challenge to their power by centralizing the military.

In order to achieve these results Pavel Dybenko and the sailors’ soviet Tsentrobalt were destined to become ashes under the rug of historical significance. 

George M. Levy

January 2015