The Untoward Legacy of Pavel Yefimovitch Dybenko

                 The Untoward Legacy of Pavel Yefimovitch Dybenko     
         

        Viewing Pavel Dybenko in the darkest of terms i.e. executioner political adventurist does a disservice to the many Russians who believed in what they wanted...made choices to make possible a better future...with dignity and a proud spirit inherent within all Russians. Universal held opinions on Great October which maintains the movement was nothing more than a “Bolshevik” coup does much harm to the populist ideals desiring freedoms and representation.  Incontrovertibly, having lived under the Romanov rule for hundreds of years; Russians looked forward to and were on the precipice of a dynamic shift in social policy.   This sentiment evidenced by the quantity of films and photographic images of the sheer number of individuals taking to the streets in the early decades of the twentieth century.  Witnessing the support demonstrated time and again in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities, towns, and villages brings one to reasonably conclude Russia having had enough of life under the heavy handed rule of the Romanov.

Concomitantly the actions of the sailors and in particular the members of the Baltic Fleet were coming to fruition.  Numerous years previous to Great October the sailors had been involved in a real life and death struggle with the authorities who supported the autocracy.   Many a sailor whose bodies are littered throughout the Black Sea and Baltic Sea were willing to die for the initiative which held clear a belief eloquently put by Dybenko as he spoke to his sailors

                         The time has come to show how to die for the revolution! 

                         For it is better to die for freedom and dignity than to live without either

An investigation of Pavel Dybenko reveals the story of a complex Russian man who has been defined, disparaged, and reviled by multiple leaders of opposing political viewpoints.  Kerensky benefits from having Dybenko removed from his authority in Tsentrobalt.   Lenin benefits from Dybenko being unceremoniously relieved from his base of influence.  Even after Dybenko was removed from power; the clergy alleges any mayhem committed by sailors had been directed by Dybenko.  

Contemporary Historians are in support of the demonizing viewpoints on Dybenko. Abiding authors endorse the vilification, historians such as Savchenkov, suggest atrocities committed in Ukraine during the Civil War have been attributed to Dybenko.  Suvorov tells his readers in subsequent years one sees Dybenko reinventing himself as a stupid careerist who favored the bottle. 
As a result, history has been unforgiving when dealing with Dybenko.  He is one of what historians’ terms as losers. A wise professor once put forth the concept, "But that is why historians need to exist --to examine 'losers' as well as 'winners'.  Otherwise, we will never understand the complexities of history".  
 
What would Pavel Dybenko say to the Russian public?  How would he respond to current conclusions of certain historical politicians; who seek to gain widespread Public support by vilifying everything related to Soviet system and by proxy those connected within its structures?
Are there people of the Soviet system who need to be vilified?  Absolutely!
Yet, the narrative following the question, “How does Dybenko, a solid young Russian who according to Kollontai and others, ‘best represented freedoms ideas’ during the tumultuous year 1917, end up with such a apathetic legacy?”, remains unspoken. 

Unfortunate for the man who throughout the days of 1917 was described to have had a great sense of being an eloquent speaker and of having absolute respect and authority with the sailors.  N. F. Izmailov believed it was by Dybenko's leadership that Tsentrobalt skillfully brought together many of the revolutionary ideals.  When the sailors all came together from the many different ships for a meeting, all indefatigable, energetic and loud...it required a lot of skill to keep this crowd under control and to channel their energy the right way.  According to Lt. Col. B.R. Bek, "It must not be forgotten that the victory of the Revolutions in February, March, and in October 1917, was due chiefly to the activity, firmness, and self-sacrifice of the members of the Baltic Fleet”.    One may also consider, “How does the “soul of the Baltic Fleet”, the “hero of the revolution”, author of the Charter of Tsentrobalt, author of the Democritization of the Fleet among many other historic documents become ignorant and illiterate within a few months? 

Indubitably, it’s a long story…

In the spring of 1917, the sailors of the Baltic Fleet agreed to create an organization, a body of elected individuals to oversee and mange the fleet’s relationship with the governing bodies.   Pavel Dybenko would ascend to the leadership of this Committee named Tsentrobalt.   Although the sailors were considered radical and disorganized by Russia’s political leaders…there were Admirals who were quite pleased and willing to find common ground with the sailors.  Commander in Chief Admiral Maksimov chooses to cooperate with Tsentrobalt, and a rather remarkable degree of harmonization was achieved between the sailors’ organization and the commandment staff.

As a result of cooperation with Admiral Maksimov, a Helsingfors dispatch stated that Tsentrobalt has decided to send a wire-less message to the allied fleets, saying that the Baltic fleet and the army defending its base is in complete readiness to fight to the last in defense of free Russia.   Newspapers printed the following communique from the offices of Tsentrobalt.

 “The Russian Baltic Fleet has now recognized the authority of the new Provisional Government, according to dispatches received today, and is under the control of the new Government.  After the first success of the revolution there were fears that the Baltic fleet would not bow to the authority of the new Government”

Even with giving the new government a supporting endorsement the political aspirations of the sailors were still concentrated in improving the military, social, and economic standing of not only the sailors but of all in Russia.  Led by Dybenko, the sailors remained faithful to the principles of representation of the people, the Soviets.  The working class of Russia looked upon the sailors as their most faithful brothers.  The sailors’ positions were not as radical as contemporary historians would have one believe. Other historians such as Dr. Evan Mawdsley relate Dybenko’s political views as being most likely leaning toward the center. 

Dybenko recalled this time and wrote,

“It is common belief that the Provisional government lost its authority over the Baltic Fleet only at the end of September 1917 but that is wrong.  The authority of the Provisional government over the Baltic Fleet was lost in fact back in April 1917.  The fleet was living its own separate life, went its own way notwithstanding government policy and even though there were some hesitations they do not contradict the fact the actual power over the Baltic Fleet was lost by the government already in April.”

Corroboration of the fleet’s independent political vision can be found in a 1915 Okhrana report. This report focused on the political activity of the Petrograd Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party and concluded that the political circles of the fleet arose independently and outside of the influence of the politico’s in Petrograd.

Alexander Kerensky and the Provisional Government are not all together pleased with the draft of Tsentrobalt and did not agree with Admiral Maksimov’s tacit approval.  Kerensky moves to replace Admiral Maksimov with an appointment of a new Commander, Admiral Verderevsky.  Dybenko, together with delegates of Tsentrobalt issue a formal protest against appointment of Verderevsky in place of Admiral Maksimov.  Kerensky and Verderevsky refuse to sign the sailors Charter. The delegates maintain they will still apply it until the All-Russian Navy Congress

Seeing the independence Tsentrobalt demonstrated, Lenin seeks to influence the political will of the sailors.  Lenin dispatches several of his political cohorts to Helsingfors…to make connections with Dybenko and move him toward a more favorable position…the “Bolshevik” view. 

Antonov Ovseenko was the first Petrograd Committee politico to gain some foresight into the sailors’ leader.  Oveseenko establishes connections with Tsentrobalt when he arrives in Helsingfors the main base of the Baltic fleet.  Immediately he was made aware of the man they called Dybenko.  Antonov Ovseenko recalled  “...he stood out with his completed solidity, low voice, confidence in his walk, calm reserved look -black eyes and curly beard – a beautiful fellow, and very businesslike. He is the chairman of Tsentrobalt and “an old sailor from the flagship”.

Another long-standing political ally of the Bolshevik elite also came to Helsingfors. Her name was Alexsandra Kollontai and from 1915 to 1917 (when she joined the Bolshevik Party) she was one of Lenin’s few faithful advocates, and he wrote to her frequently.  Perhaps Kollontai can tame the man who presides over the armed force destined to have a hand in seeing to it who holds the levers of government.  Kollontai would become a driving force in helping the Petrograd Committee influence Dybenko into acquiring confidence in Lenin and her associates.  

However, political parties notwithstanding it would take until September before Dybenko and the sailors move to back the Bolsheviks.  In the summer of 1917, definitions of freedoms and power were being fought over not only by the political elite but also by men like Dybenko.  For Russia, the path to freedom and societal strengthening would not be determined by a workers revolution as Marx, Lenin, and others hoped as strikes and demonstrations had always been easily suppressed but through the unwavering determination of Dybenko and the armed first of the sailors of the Baltic Fleet.  

A combination of events unfolds as Dybenko and Tsentrobalt not only see the government dismissing Chief in Command Admiral Maximoff, a great communicator, with a more ardent and stringent Admiral Vederevsky.  At the same time, the powers in government found resolving the nation’s predicament complicated.  They would not end the war nor address the masses concern regarding land and liberty.  Former Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev described the ministers as inept unable to deal with current crisis’s and accordingly the leaders of the time inferred if Russia was not to be led by the Tsar, then the Tsar’s current policies would still remain in effect.  This action or inaction…forces Dybenko and Tsentrobalt to once again prod the government into an accountable social democracy.  Consequently, in July of 1917, Dybenko and Tsentrobalt take to the governing body a resolution calling for Kerensky’s resignation and the taking of reins for government by the Soviet leaders.  This political body, for the record, was not at this time, in July of 1917, dominated by the Bolsheviks.   Siding with Kerensky; the Soviet body refuses to consider Tsentrobalts resolution culminating with detention and or arrests of all sailors involved including Dybenko. 

For Lenin, witnessing the political inadequacy of the current leaders in power and the strength of the fleets’ political vision, he nails down his plan for dominance.  Always attentive for opportunity…Lenin’s political views move to the left, he would begin what G.P. Maximoff described as the greatest fraud perpetuated against the Russian people.  As a good politician Lenin spoke to the issues held close to the vest of the Russian citizen…idealism's closer to that of Dybenko and the sailors.  Quite the change as it was well known in the socialist and libertarian movements that prior to 1917, Lenin advocated for what many regarded as opportunistic vanguard-ism; the idea that the radical intelligentsia were going to exploit popular movements to seize state power and then to use the state power to persuade the population into the society that they chose.  

So Lenin lied…and the masses believed because they wanted to.   So did Dybenko and the sailors…with Lenin’s testimonies and Kollontai’s insistence that Lenin was indeed sincere as the leader for the party, the leader for Russia. 

Dybenko looked to the intellectuals to tend to the matters of social policy and the administering of government.  Believing they clearly heard the protestations and would make good on the promise of improving the conditions in the lives of the Russian people.  For the third time in seven months,Dybenko moves to support this latest group of intellectual elites.  Dybenko makes his decision formal at the Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region held at Petrograd in early October.  Historian Alexander Rabinowitch views the Congress as a thundering, highly visible expression of ultra radical sentiment.  Others might say the Congress was a more polished and better-delivered presentation of “All Power to the Soviets”: the message the sailors and Dybenko struggled to communicate in July.  There were similarities, in both circumstances: Kerensky was called upon to resign, the request for the control of government transfer into the responsible hands of the All Russian Executive Committee of Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasant Deputies, with assurance the fleet would safeguard the move.  But this time was different…the Bolsheviks held a majority in the Soviet.

“Dybenko addressed the Congress…”The Russian Fleet has always stood in the front lines of the Revolution.  The names of its sailors are written in the book of the history of the struggle against Tsarism.  In the earliest days of the Revolution the sailors marched in the front ranks, our ultimate aim being deliverance from all misery.  And this life and death struggle with our own oppressors gives us the right to appeal to you, proletarians of all countries, with a strong voice against the exploiters.  Break the chains, you who are oppressed!  Rise in revolt!  We have nothing to lose but our chains!  We believe in the victory of the Revolution, we are full of this belief.  We know that our comrades in the Revolution will fulfill their duty on the barricades to the bitter end.  We know that decisive moments are coming.  A gigantic struggle will set the world afire.  On the horizon the fires of the revolt of all oppressed peoples are already glowing and becoming stronger”

“We demand from the Soviet of Soldiers, Workmen and Peasant Deputies and the Tsentroflot the immediate removal from the ranks of the Provisional Government of the “Socialist,”--political adventurer Kerensky, as one who is scandalizing and ruining the Great Revolution, and with it the great revolutionary people, by his shameful political blackmail in behalf of the bourgeoisie”

Finally, Dybenko ended with a confident, “the crews of the fleet were ready to both repel the invader (the German) and determine the form of government in Petrograd”.

And so the populist movement known as Great October came to pass.  Kerensky cowering in a room at Gatchina Palace…wonders if Dybenko his arch enemy has arrived. 

Before his arrest…General Krasnov prepares to sign the truce agreement between the Cossacks and Dybenko.   The people rejoice…civil war had been avoided and the change of government appears to have happened virtually bloodless. 

Sorry to say for Mother Russia in this part of her history all’s not well that ends well. 

Lenin and Trotsky are furious that Dybenko had reached an accord with the Cossacks.

One that not only appeared favorable for the Cossacks but had disgracefully, according to the Bolshevik leaders, called for the removal or voluntary stepping down from government of Lenin and Trotsky.    Lenin was infuriated, demanding the annulment of the agreement as Dybenko was not entrusted with working out a peace accord rather his authority, as Lenin concluded, ended with an agreement to end hostilities. 

As soon as the revolution began it was over.  Dybenko was not, yet, court-martialed as the leaders wanted, although the writing is on the wall…the sailor’s minds were still fresh with the wonderment of revolution and Lenin feared immediate retribution. 

Lenin still played…advocating by decree everything imagined by a free man.  Some of which addressed land, liberty, and the removal of capital punishment once again,   

Lenin’s plan to institute his authoritarian designs was destined to take several months more.  By the first of March 1918 Lenin and his cronies had done away with most soviets including the most visible one, Tsentrobalt.   Lenin’s opportunistic vanguardism was clearly the winner as the so called Bolshevik coup, the party now named the “Communists” did indeed ride on the backs of the populist movement Great October.  Politicians involved in government were to be removed for any disagreement or dissent and Trotsky would become the new authority for the military. 

Lenin and Trotsky promoted the idea of total subordination.  Trotsky maintained, “What you need is a Labor Army which is submissive to the control of a single leader.   Modern progress and development requires the mass of the population to subordinate themselves to a single leader in a disciplined workforce

Subordination, discipline, submissive all words that hadn’t been heard of before except from the authorities Tsentrobalt, Dybenko, and the sailors had fought against. 
In contrast, the Democritization of the Fleet, authored by Dybenko between Great October and the Lenin’s Coup of March 1918 still held and spoke to precious rights thought to have been the harvest of the Revolution.  The contents of this draft not only speaks to freedoms of assembly and speech but also addresses the need for the governing body of the fleet, the Central Committee of the Sea, to maintain its independence and self-rule.                                                                                                                                  “All sailors of the Navy have the right to be members of any political, national, religious, economic, or professional organization, society or union.  They have the right, freely and openly, to express and profess by word or mouth, in writing or in print, their political, religious, and other views”

Dybenko failed at supporting the authoritative designs of Lenin and Trotsky…fermenting the disparaging nature historians and archival materials embrace him with. 

Having completely reviewed the events of Dybenko and the year 1917, many Russians can absolutely hold their head high…for within the mind of the world’s proletariat Russians will always be thought of individuals with an innate ideology of espousing freedom and opportunity for all. 

Did the struggle for reform seem futile?  It did pave the way for a government far worse than anyone imagined.  Was this government preferred by those millions who took to the streets in anticipation for the dawn of a new era?  Absolutely not!  Dybenko and many other solid freedom fighters including millions of Russians believed in the righteousness of mankind.  Russia put all her faith in the enlightened minorities…Prince Lvov’s Provisional Government, Kerensky’s Provisional Government, the Soviet leadership and lastly the few so called Bolshevik intellectuals all turned out to be either inept or nothing more than greedy individuals lustful for power. 

In the end analysis, the Russian people should take exceptional pride in the people they are.  Russians who believed in living free and with dignity manifested that desire into making Great October possible.  Those in support of Great October should not be burdened with a paralyzing sense of guilt, shouldn't  take on the baggage that today’s politicians are quick to place at their feet.  Contemporary politicians who attempt to correlate...who associate freedoms dreams with the authoritarianism employed by Lenin and afterward Stalin display a mindset that is shortsighted at best.       

George M. Levy

December  2013